Opinions on Afghanistan

Free - You've made many posts bitching and moaning (not a disparaging term) about the lack of infrastructure. Why is that? (The lack of infrastructure, not your pissing and moaning :D) I assume that it's because the focus has been on IZ, and with the change of administration, there hasn't been much focus anywhere over there. So, what's needed - other than what GEN McC has requested?

I, too, agree with 7.62. What makes my heart hurt is that we're re-learning lessons already taught. And it's been a pretty short time since we learned them the first time. Hell, it hasn't been that long since the Sovs did what they did -- and we should have learned lessons from their adventures :doh:

What infrastructure isn't there - in your opinion?
 
Free - You've made many posts bitching and moaning (not a disparaging term) about the lack of infrastructure. Why is that? (The lack of infrastructure, not your pissing and moaning :D) I assume that it's because the focus has been on IZ, and with the change of administration, there hasn't been much focus anywhere over there. So, what's needed - other than what GEN McC has requested?

I, too, agree with 7.62. What makes my heart hurt is that we're re-learning lessons already taught. And it's been a pretty short time since we learned them the first time. Hell, it hasn't been that long since the Sovs did what they did -- and we should have learned lessons from their adventures :doh:

What infrastructure isn't there - in your opinion?

No offense taken, Sir.

In no particular order:

Communications: "Net-Centric" may be a cute buzz phrase but it is reality. As you know ISR platforms and methods are data-intensive....they soak up a lot of bandwith. You have to add to it email and Net activity, think of how many documents are sent via email or accessed on a Sharepoint server. This takes a toll on bandwidth, all of which is delivered via satellite. You also have cable, IP addresses, computers, phones..... A lot of moving parts that are not cheap. Without getting into specifics, we need more of the above and adding additional bodies will tax an already strained system.

Land: Some locations weren't built with the number of troops currently in country in mind. I spoke to one camp mayor this week that is looking at projected troop numbers vs. existing billeting and office space and he doesn't have enough of the latter. I went to one camp where the mayor was trying to find space to park all of his vehicles AND house an influx of new troops. Some camps HAVE to expand, they don't have any choice, but terrain is a limiting factor.

Supplies: We don't have Kuwait/ Basra to help keep us going. Karachi plus our air bridge is barely working. The bad guys know that they can attack our resupply routes in Pakistan with relative impunity; commanders are even accepting a certain amount of supplies being lost in Pakistan. The air bridge is too costly and can't support us, we need Karachi and Pakistan.

Buildings: B-huts that were supposed to be torn down in 2006 are still being used because we aren't buildinig permanent or semi-permanent facilities fast enough. We've tried employing the locals to help us build them.....some barracks and even pre-fabbed steel buildings are taking over a year to complete. Afghanis make our DOT look efficient. Our Corps of Engineers, Combat Engineers, and Red Horse units are.....not here and if they are we don't have enough of them and besides, building materials have to travel through Pakistan.

Aircraft: We don't have enough of any type, combat or support.

Here's what killed us: we spent 2003-2007 staring at Iraq while Afghanistan burned. We funneled money and support into the country, staffs were ordered to ignore Afghanistan in order to focus on Iraq (phone calls and email went unreturned for days while staffs in the rear worked on Iraq), officers and NCOs viewed Afghanistan as a career-killer and preferred to go to Iraq.....

Iraq is a major reason why were are in this boat today. I think our rapid, SOF-based victory made us think the war was over and if it did continue it would be easy to deal with. I am still amazed at the officers and senior NCOs who don't grasp that Afghanistan has mountains in excess of 15k feet and that many location are inaccessible during the winter.

We have enough challenges here without being our own enemy.
 
No offense taken, Sir.

In no particular order:

Communications: Bandwidth is a problem around the globe. Not an excuse - a reality.

Land: Terrain is always a limiting factor, therefore a planning factor. It really surprises me when you say that commanders and their senior NCOs are surprised about the terrain. That's one of the first two or three things I think about when I think about A-stan.

Supplies: .....we need Karachi and Pakistan. Concur

Buildings: See above - we need a "sustainment base from which to bring in, well, sustainment.

Aircraft: We don't have enough of any type, combat or support. They may or may not get there. Depends upon what current administration will focus

Here's what killed us: we spent 2003-2007 staring at Iraq while Afghanistan burned. Again....concur


Iraq is a major reason why were are in this boat today. I think our rapid, SOF-based victory made us think the war was over and if it did continue it would be easy to deal with. I am still amazed at the officers and senior NCOs who don't grasp that Afghanistan has mountains in excess of 15k feet and that many location are inaccessible during the winter.

We have enough challenges here without being our own enemy.

Don't ever call me "Sir" again, or I"ll find a way through the miasma that you describe, to get there and beat your ass :D


I agree with everything you said. I find it hard to believe that folks would have rather gone to IZ instead of the Stan, but I know the mindset you're talking about. But damn, that's where it started and that's where it's going to be for a while.......shit, I sat thru sandstorms at Arrifjan for a week trying to get to Bagram - because that's where my people were and that's where I believe the fight is (Not necessarily Bagram.....but A-stan).

Read "Cobra II," if you haven't. It's about the planning leading up to the invasion of IZ. For those of us who've been around, it's not very surprising about all the poilitics involved (and the pressure brought to bear on GEN Franks by the SECDEF), but it gives insight into just what you're talking about - how the focus shifted away from A-stan to IZ.
 
I read Cobra II based on your recommendation, read it twice actually so far and will probably get to it again in 3-4 months (when I'm done with my 6th book covering the Great Game). It is a great book and reaffirmed my hatred for Rummy and his crew.

Bandwidth exists, but I agree that it is a problem worldwide. The real issue is that no one was forward-thinking enough to get ahead of the curve; we've reacted and it has hurt us at times. You can't wait until your pipe is saturated before requesting more....it is too late.

Terrain: I think the scope of the terrain and the size was something that some weren't prepared for. A great case: The Pech River valley is narrow and the mountains and ridges around it can be very steep at times, land is at a premium and we usually don't dominate the high ground. That has shaped certain aspects of our life here.

And back in 04-06 I had Army and AF O's and NCO's complain that they were here and not Iraq with many lamenting about the careers because they were sent to the, as one called it, "B Team war." If their worries were unfounded then we still have a problem when such a wide-range of personalities, jobs, and backgrounds were all thinking the same thing.

As a support guy I look at these things, critically at times, maybe too critically. I can never, will never, rationalize sending guys out to troll for IEDs or kick in doors or meet with village elders while providing them half-assed logistical, communications, and intelligence support. It isn't how I was raised many years ago and I'll go to my grave believing that world-class combat arms deserve world-class combat and service support. I think we have failed or are failing in some of those areas. We can turn things around, they aren't lost, but will we? Do we possess the depth of faith (and resources) to go as far as is needed?

Oh, I'll still call you "sir," I just won't capitalize it. Take that! :D
 
Free I understand some of your points but having not been there leaves me short on first hand information. Before I retired last year I toured some infrastructure belonging to the Big Army in the US.

I will say that if we are no better at supporting infrastructure in country than we are in the US we are in trouble. I was Director of a public works owned by the Army and I can tell you what we house our troops in is discusting. We have to understand to pay for the fighting materials is not enough. We have to have infrastucture to house and support our troops and their families.

I draw a correlation between our gangs in the US and the tribal environment in Asia, HOA, and our current locations. We sure aren't doing very well on gangs here and I know first hand how we did in asia. I will have to rely on you and others to tell me how we are doing in your part of the world?

Every time we do something it is like the first time it has ever been done. Last year I read a report on the SIPRNET and the phrase Hearts and Minds was used. :doh:

Burn the Poppies plant crops send tractors and get the hell out. :2c:
 
Free, any strategy or plan is only as good as the ability to manage and resource it. I think our leaders forget that...and I think you've made good points that illustrate that fact. Our leaders tend to focus on The Bottom Line and fail to grasp the complexities involved. You can never decouple strategy from resources.

There is so much bullshit rhetoric that comes out in war and the harsh realities are buried under a pile of it. Politicians--and military leaders, too--can fall in love with illusions and denial. I saw it every day in VN and I see it, from a distance, now.
 
If people who hang out all day on the boardwalk in KAF and in line at the DQ in BAF woulld do their jobs, this "war" would be over.
 
If people who hang out all day on the boardwalk in KAF and in line at the DQ in BAF woulld do their jobs, this "war" would be over.

Crazy talk! Those people are important! We need MORE fobbits, more I tell you!
 
Anyone caught in PTs between 8-8 should be sent immediately to a Firebase. Stack the turds 10 high to replace the torn hescos. if they arent going to do their jobs, might as well protect the war fighters.

The LNs are useless, this is going to be a long process to get them on their feet. No amount money we dump in is going to get them a pair.
 
In reviewing the whole thread this morning, I agree with what the troll said. Of course, most of what he said, (IMO) was based on the way SF soldier's are trained to think. I also have to agree with what Car had to say about our never ending failure to grasp the lessons of the past and in turn having to learn the same old lessons the hard way once again. I also like many of the points made by FF. My bottom line is that I hope we don't pull out of the 'Stan and have it turn into what it was before a haven and training for terrorists from all over the world. To me the key to winning in the 'Stan is solving the problems with and in Pakistan.
 
What really constitutes a "Win" in Afghan ??? What's the end game there ?

Are we going to put the needed financial resources into building roads, waterworks, schools and help create a viable industry to which Afghan can begin in the future to import and export goods and services ??

Again, this is game of "whack a mole" and I really don't see a "Win" unless the entire population decides to take sides with us and form a 1,000,000 strong army and police force with air and ground assets which match that of our own capbilities.

I have a feeling our SOF forces are in for a long stay. Permanent bases ? PCS type orders for the next 40-50 years ???

I'm a bit out of my lane here since I haven't ever stepped foot in the middle east, but great thread thus far.
 
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