We Won in Iraq?

[AWP]

War is not a continuation of politics, war is the measure used when politics has broken down. We can't work out our differences, so now we will fight them out. Where politics comes back into play, is when the winner of that war, allows the occupied nation to take a role in the occupation and or post war governing of the defeated nation.

I guess that's one way to look at it. I disagree 100%.

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk8ch06.html

We know, certainly, that war is only called forth through the political intercourse of Governments and nations; but in general it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own.
We maintain, on the contrary: that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say, mixed with other means, in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on which the events of the war progress, and to which they are attached, are only the general features of policy which run all through the war until peace takes place. And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different nations and Governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.
Accordingly, war can never be separated from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.

 

[Marauder06]

I guess that's one way to look at it. I disagree 100%.

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk8ch06.html

Yeah, most people who study politics and pretty much every career Soldier I've talked to about this topic recognizes that warfare really is all about politics by other means.

 

[Brill]

How about some original source material that describes our objectives from like 2008 on?

Ok.

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/101771.pdf

From page 14:

2003 - Regime change

2007 -“Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well-integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.” What?

CENTCOM defined the OIF military objectives this way: “destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government; destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure; protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks; destroy terrorist networks in Iraq, gather intelligence on global terrorism, detain terrorists and war criminals, and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime; and support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.”

This states refined objectives under President Obama: the goal is “an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant.”

Work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists;

Help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world;

and Forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.

 

[Marauder06]

Good job brother.

 

[Brill]

I guess that's one way to look at it. I disagree 100%.

http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk8ch06.html

I found this paper very interesting:

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: WHAT WENT WRONG?
A CLAUSEWITZIAN ANALYSIS

Clayton Dennison, Ph.D. Candidate, Center for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary

http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/download/105/115

"The purpose of this investigation will be twofold. First, it will be demonstrated that in key areas of decision making, in the planning and execution stages of O.I.F., U.S. strategists either misapplied, or disavowed altogether, those principles of strategy most recognized and esteemed in Western military academies, those codified in Carl von Clausewitz’s book On War. 4 Second, it will be shown that these decisions had negative consequences which undermined the U.S. war effort."

 

[Brill]

Pretty shocked the/an invasion was planned long before boots on ground but the "peace" wasn't considered until Jan 2003? Abu?

 

[Totentanz]

How about some original source material that describes our objectives from like 2008 on?

I'm curious as to why you chose 2008. The last two years of a seven-year operation (OIF, based on start in 2003, terminating in OND in 2010) seems a little close to the ambiguous finish line to start deciding what the finish line is, and two years is a short time span for a strategic anything.

Either way, looking at the 2008 National Defense Strategy, one of the objectives is "Win Our Nation's Wars" (FWIW the expanded version is more commentary on maintaining capability than it is a discussion on warfighting, with little say directly regarding ongoing conflict). Marking one of your objectives as "winning" seems like circular logic to me, but what do I know?

The more relevant content is found under "Win the Long War", which speaks on the role of OIF and OEF in terms of long term suppression of extremist threats. A few parts in particular stand out from this section:

"The use of force plays a role, yet military
efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to
promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur
development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often
lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important
military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we
do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern
themselves."

By our own logic, military success is not enough (in any current conflict pertaining to extremism) to call this a "win".

Also...
"The struggle against violent extremists will not end with a single battle or
campaign. Rather, we will defeat them through the patient accumulation of quiet
successes and the orchestration of all elements of national and international power.
We will succeed by eliminating the ability of extremists to strike globally and
catastrophically while also building the capacity and resolve of local governments
to defeat them regionally. Victory will include discrediting extremist ideology,
creating fissures between and among extremist groups and reducing them to the
level of nuisance groups that can be tracked and handled by law enforcement
capabilities."

Again we see acknowledgement that the military is not the only element that will be needed (nor the most important) to "win the long war", of which the Battle of Iraq (a battle in the context of the longer war) was a significant component.

Keep in mind, this isn't speaking about Iraq/OIF directly, but it should give us a solid definition of what a "win" should look like if it's to be nested with the strategy above, and should readily advance the critical components above-described objective.

Based on this, would you call Iraq a win? I wouldn't say we did a whole lot to discredit the ideology, and although AQ is "on the run", they've maintained the capability to attack us.... hardly reduced to the level of nuisance groups. Further, I don't think our actions in Iraq successfully "promoted security" or "deterred conflict" in central Asia (two of the other objectives listed). While we may not necessarily have kicked a hornets' nest and drawn a colossal increase in CONUS attacks, is the region any more secure and less conflicted than before?

If I get time, I'll see if I can dig something out this weekend from the 2000-2003 timeframe (the QDR from 30 SEP 2001 has some interesting content, but was likely written before the attacks).
-

 

[Polar Bear]

No we didn't, it will be a shit hole in 5 years. Have not read one post in this thread because it is a fucking train wreak with just the title. I am sure there are 2 to 3 who are in disagreement with me and have already argued the point. You are wrong. As I stated before have not read one line in this thread and will not. Iraq is a shithole and will be forever.

 

[Kraut783]

But...but...we just sold them Apaches.....:wall:

 

[dknob]

It's sad as an Iraq veteran... I don't even know when the war ended. I have no idea if it was a victory for us.

 

[pardus]

It's sad as an Iraq veteran... I don't even know when the war ended. I have no idea if it was a victory for us.

The war never ended, we just left.

As an Iraq vet you should be proud of the job you did. My .02c

 

[LogDog0402]

Where the strategists went wrong, IMO, is they didn't take into consideration cultural differences. I remember some of my fellow advisors would get wrapped around the axel trying to stamp out corruption among Iraqi officials. The Marine Officers were some of the worst offenders of having this mindset as very few had my approach of letting it go unless it started to interfere with border security operations. I had a few instances where I seized money and goods from the Iraqis to prove a point, gave it all back later and made sure we did a joint inventory of the seized items so nothing came up missing later.

Back on point, not understanding the cultural differences is a failure of the leadership. I think the mindset was we are going to give them freedom, democracy and McD's and they'll love us for it. We took a group of people that weren't ready for freedom the way Americans enjoy it and gave them a big ass scoop of it. I think one could argue that being liberated instead of winning your freedom through a supported uprising makes a difference in the mental state of the people.

As an Iraq vet I am proud of the job I did and I like to think that maybe it made an impact of the Iraqis I worked with.