Why is CA considered SOF?

Question then. When USMC Civil Affairs deploy, do they execute a CMO mission in accordance with JP 3-57? Going back to actual execution of Civil Affairs role in any theater doesn't typically fall under any service specific Command. SOCOM doesn't have OPCON/TACON Army Civil Affairs.

I'm not an expert but I believe that they do but they do so underneath the operational and tactical command of a Marine Corps unit, normally the MEF or MEB. Who owns Army Civil Affairs at home and in theater normally? They don't work for the TSOC?
 
I'm not an expert but I believe that they do but they do so underneath the operational and tactical command of a Marine Corps unit, normally the MEF or MEB. Who owns Army Civil Affairs at home and in theater normally? They don't work for the TSOC?

I'm definitely not either. Likely depends on the theater. Was hoping someone that's actually CA would chime in, but my understanding is that they would be OPCON/TACON to the JTF or SOJTF. Up to the JFC's J9. Outside of a combat theater, you're probably right with it being either the TSOC or GCC. I've only ever seen one or two CA guys at TSOC levels... but if you've seen one TSOC, you've seen one TSOC.
 
I do know that Marine Corps civil affairs units fall under Marine operational commands (MEB or MEF) in theater. They do not fall directly under the TSOC or geographic combatant command.
 
To sum it up in laymen's terms without using doctrinal definitions, we could word it something like this-

CA may be classified as special operations because it seeks to achieve a military objective through atypical fashions.

This is what sets them apart from USAID and other NGOs. Whereas non-gov't HA groups are just trying to feed people, CA is working to improve quality of life/infrastructure/whatever with the specific intent of making the focus group less reliant/trusting/beholden to/whatever on whoever the malign actor of the day is.

Soooo, the operations are special.
 
To sum it up in laymen's terms without using doctrinal definitions, we could word it something like this-

CA may be classified as special operations because it seeks to achieve a military objective through atypical fashions.

This is what sets them apart from USAID and other NGOs. Whereas non-gov't HA groups are just trying to feed people, CA is working to improve quality of life/infrastructure/whatever with the specific intent of making the focus group less reliant/trusting/beholden to/whatever on whoever the malign actor of the day is.

Soooo, the operations are special.

The issue with that explanation is that Army Civil Affairs are SOF and Marine Corps Civil Affairs, who perform a nearly identical mission, are presently not. The short answer is that the services determine what units are SOF and SOCOM certifies them. For example, Navy EOD and Navy divers both have very difficult pipelines that parallel some SOF units but are not SOF because the Navy has not designated them SOF in order to maintain them within the service. The Navy assigns Navy EOD to SOCOM but still controls the career fields because they are not designated SOF. Special Boat Units were not considered SOF until the Navy redesignated them SOF (SWCC) and added them to Naval Special Warfare.
 
To sum it up in laymen's terms without using doctrinal definitions, we could word it something like this-

CA may be classified as special operations because it seeks to achieve a military objective through atypical fashions.

This is what sets them apart from USAID and other NGOs. Whereas non-gov't HA groups are just trying to feed people, CA is working to improve quality of life/infrastructure/whatever with the specific intent of making the focus group less reliant/trusting/beholden to/whatever on whoever the malign actor of the day is.

Soooo, the operations are special.

That's like saying Bill Cosby just wanted sex through non-standard approaches...kinda true.
 
Just now saw this topic. I guess I had not been paying attention...I was PSYOP and thought my tag of SOF Support was appropriate as we fell under Special Operation Forces umbrella, but we are there to support the mission and the guys at the tip of the spear. I didn't know there were CA or PSYOP members sporting green SOF tags.....

I remember running into some CAT/A guys (two) in Asadabad, they were both long tabbers in 18 series billets in CA.

In 2002 our PSYOP unit was under CJSOTF-A, parceled out and 3 man teams were assigned to ODA's across A-stan. In 2003 the unit was assigned to a conventional unit in OIF I, it all depended on what was needed.
 
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People like to beat up on active duty PSYOP and CA, but guess what folks, they're SOF both by doctrine and our interpretation of it here on SS.

I don't have my files in front of me so this is based off of memory. SOF, by doctrine, are forces designated by the SecDef which are specially trained and selected to conduct highly specialized mission sets. Basically, if you can draw a straight line from your unit to SOCOM, you're SOF. This specifically includes active duty PSYOP and CA. It gets a little murkier on the Reserve side of the house. IIRC CA units in the Reserve component are not directly affiliated with SOCOM.

On ShadowSpear we are slightly more restrictive in choosing to whom we award the green SOF tag. Specifically, we consider the "specially trained and selected" verbiage. Support troops in some SOF units, specifically SF units, are neither specially selected nor trained in any meaningful capacity. An assignment to Group, for a support type, is "needs of the Army." You can go to 10th Mountain just as easily as you can go to 10th Group. Other SOF elements, such as the Ranger Regiment, 160th SOAR, and JSOC, have special training programs for both their ops types and their support types. RIP/ROP/RASP (whatever it is now) for the Rangers, selection and Green Platoon for the 160th, and whatever they do for JSOC these days.

An example: I'm an intel officer. When I was in 5th Group, I was SOF support. I got that job because my branch manager needed two MI captains there, and I was the first one to volunteer. "SOF Support." But in subsequent SOF assignments, I underwent selection and training programs and passed, thereby earning the "SOF" tag on ShadowSpear.

Other examples: active duty career-field PSYOP and CA who completed their respective A&S = green SOF tag. Support troops in PSYOP and CA = SOF support (as far as I know there is no A&S for support types going to PSYOP and CA units). Ranger qualified, never served in a SOF unit, = Verified Military. Support types in SF units usually = SOF support. LRS = specially trained and selected, but no direct line to SOCOM and not designated by SECDEF as SOF, = VerMil. Support troops in a SEAL unit usually = SOF support, again no A&S.

About the only exception to the above that I can think of is we grandfathered Force Recon in as SOF prior to the establishment of MARSOC, but I don't think we do that anymore.
 
Here is an interesting point though. the Navy's contribution to SOCOM is Naval Special Warfare (SEALs, SWCC) but Navy EOD, divers and I believe rescue swimmers fall under the naval special operations umbrella but do not fall under SOCOM.
 
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Are RRT's considered to be assigned to Force (SOF) or Fleet?
Reed

That's another interesting question. I would say that an RRT assigned to MARSOC is an invaluable SOF tool and is something we (the Marine Corps) should be making a lot more of. I think that our SOF enabler support Marines are one of the most valuable contributions our service gives to SOCOM. I believe that an RRT Marine in MARSOC is still SOF support and are not considered Raiders. I could be wrong. Personally I think we should be producing more intel/operator hybrids. We do a decent job of that with some of our human intelligence programs (that I won't expand on here) but there is something to be said about specialization in support skills.
 
Modern Marine Corps Civil Affairs units perform very similar, if not identical, functions to Army Civil Affairs but are not considered SOF. USMC Civil Affairs could conceivably fall under the SOCOM umbrella via MARSOC one day. This is not being currently discussed to my knowledge but it is possible. They would probably have to change several things about their organization to include the way they screen, select and train their people of course. I think you would be grandfathered into SOF if there were to happen.

Thanks for the reply, sir. Combined Action was a bit different as we were an ops unit who's primary mission was interdiction and killing of enemy forces through night ambushes along trails and infiltration routes. The down-time was spent in or near remote hamlets during the day, training our counterparts, developing rapport with civilians to cultivate sources of intelligence through medical treatment and other assistance projects; to counter Viet Cong intimidation and extortion with helpful acts and friendship and most importantly, backing up those acts by killing VC so civilians felt secure enough to cooperate. Statistically, even though our casualty rates were high, CAP units had a higher kill ratio than regular Marine and Army infantry units. The roughly 600 officers and men of the 2nd Combined Action Group, for example, accounted for some 3,300 EKIAs between 1969 and early 1971, more than the entire 101st Airborne Division during that time period. Westmoreland always failed to appreciate Marine Corps (and Army SF/CIDG) successes in this effective and unique approach to the war.
 
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Don't get me wrong @Ocoka One , the Combined Action Program was the best strategy to turn around a losing war. I'm convinced that Ho Chi Minh started massing troops on the North Vietnamese border to draw the Marines in the CAP platoons out of the villages and out into the bush. It's really unfortunate you were not able to continue it longer than you did. Westmoreland was a conventional officer running an unconventional war and the North Vietnamese Generals played him like a fiddle.
 
Don't get me wrong @Ocoka One , the Combined Action Program was the best strategy to turn around a losing war. I'm convinced that Ho Chi Minh started massing troops on the North Vietnamese border to draw the Marines in the CAP platoons out of the villages and out into the bush. It's really unfortunate you were not able to continue it longer than you did. Westmoreland was a conventional officer running an unconventional war and the North Vietnamese Generals played him like a fiddle.
I wonder how WestmoWestmorelandin regard to Giap's quote about American tactical victories being, "irrelevant."

Giap made a great point, what he failed to mention was the fact that US leadership is what made them irrelevant.
 
Don't get me wrong @Ocoka One , the Combined Action Program was the best strategy to turn around a losing war. I'm convinced that Ho Chi Minh started massing troops on the North Vietnamese border to draw the Marines in the CAP platoons out of the villages and out into the bush. It's really unfortunate you were not able to continue it longer than you did. Westmoreland was a conventional officer running an unconventional war and the North Vietnamese Generals played him like a fiddle.


I bolded that significant sentence because it applies equally well to the SF Village Stability Operations (VSO) initiated in Afghanistan. This was a similar concept that began, like CAP, maybe too late in the war. The problem with VSO-- from what I've read (and CAP for that matter), is that it needed support from the top. Karzai, and some Big Army folk didn't like it or doubted its possibilities even though it started to show significant results fairly soon after implementation.

I don't know if any of our SS folk, SF/SOF/CA were involved in the VSO program, but I'd sure like to hear their opinion.

Back around '04 or '05, my association, COUNTERPARTS, was invited to MacDill to discuss our lessons from Vietnam with folks from CENTCOM/SOCOM. At the time our members were encouraged that our pool of knowledge--and we have many former MAT team officers, SF/CIDG people, Marine CoVans, combined action officers and NCOs--was being tapped into.
 
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@Ocoka One
Possibly due to some of those meetings in '04/'05, our enterprise at SOCOM took a pretty active role in helping the specific sub-components on locations to get the best gain from VSO. Identifying specific locations based on some pretty complex geospatial models. We would take approx. six to eight weeks to develop these models with amplifying supporting INT, but it was still on the units to take advantage of these products.
 
@Ocoka One
Possibly due to some of those meetings in '04/'05, our enterprise at SOCOM took a pretty active role in helping the specific sub-components on locations to get the best gain from VSO. Identifying specific locations based on some pretty complex geospatial models. We would take approx. six to eight weeks to develop these models with amplifying supporting INT, but it was still on the units to take advantage of these products.

I guess it was around that time that the mission was morphing into the Hearts & Minds phase. The Special Forces VSO initiative had some pretty smart people writing the playbook, senior SF officers who looked at it comprehensively, who knew their history, who knew what it would take to make it work. Not only the teams protecting the villages, conducting FID and CA, but the structure of support and resources that stretches from the villages to Kabul to the DoD and DoS, into the NGO, commercial, academic, multinational spheres.
 
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I guess it was around that time that the mission was morphing into the Hearts & Minds phase. The Special Forces VSO initiative had some pretty smart people writing the playbook, senior SF officers who looked at it comprehensively, who knew their history, who knew what it would take to make it work. Not only the teams protecting the villages, conducting FID and CA, but the structure of support and resources that stretches from the villages to Kabul to the DoD and DoS, into the NGO, commercial, academic, multinational spheres.

But, like Vietnam, the war was winding down, the politicians wanted to pull out, (the POTUS even gave a the Taliban the withdrawal date), and VSO, like CAP, died from lack of interest.

@pardus pointed out to me last year some COIN operations that worked, notably the SAS in Oman and some others, and made this bitter Marine a believer that Hearts & Minds campaigns can succeed...but only if all the support pieces fall into place. And that is a very big order, especially for an impatient society like ours.

We were providing that level of support till at least 2012, and maybe similar support to other units heading that way a little bit after. They ended up being pretty cookie cutter as far as models go because just insert new data and then go from there. What was missing was the bottom-up communication and metrics for success. We can push that support down to the lowest level all day long, but if we have nothing to measure VSO deployments over time than the effort is almost wasted.

Honestly this is a common theme throughout other SOF deployments. MISTs and CATs have a horrible track record of communicating back to the TSOC and most of the metrics seemed to stay at the service component group level.
 
Doesn't Radio Recon go through an A&S of some sort?


That's another interesting question. I would say that an RRT assigned to MARSOC is an invaluable SOF tool and is something we (the Marine Corps) should be making a lot more of. I think that our SOF enabler support Marines are one of the most valuable contributions our service gives to SOCOM. I believe that an RRT Marine in MARSOC is still SOF support and are not considered Raiders. I could be wrong. Personally I think we should be producing more intel/operator hybrids. We do a decent job of that with some of our human intelligence programs (that I won't expand on here) but there is something to be said about specialization in support skills.
 
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