Why Japan lost the war....

Funny you posted this. I read it 3 days ago while researching another topic on that site. It is a great resource and the founder's are excellent authors. I reviewed Shattered Sword here and highly recommend the book.

ETA: can't type to save my life
 
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I haven't read Shattered Sword yet, but's on my list (along with about 25 other books). I like the premise of the essay....that Japan's loss would have been inevitable if not quite-as-quick had the US 'lost' Midway. You don't hear that much in books/articles about the Battle of Midway.
 
Good link.

Japan was doomed IMO, even if there'd been less of an economic/industrial/resource disparity. The list of things Japan did to hasten its self-destruction is long and, in retrospect, almost pitiable.
 
Japan had so many problems you could write a book on "why they stood no chance in hell." Germany was doomed, but it had a better chance of the USSR suing for peace than the Japanese did of any form of victory.

WWII was horrific, but it was over on Sep. 1, 1939. Minus a few long shot scenarios it was lost the day it started.
 
Japan had so many problems you could write a book on "why they stood no chance in hell." Germany was doomed, but it had a better chance of the USSR suing for peace than the Japanese did of any form of victory.

WWII was horrific, but it was over on Sep. 1, 1939. Minus a few long shot scenarios it was lost the day it started.

The axis powers were at a large disadvantage for sure but I disagree with your last paragraph. The U-Boat threat alone almost won Germany the war, as acknowledged by Churchill himself.
Japan I would venture to say was never going to win, but Germany got very close, more than once.
 
The U-Boat threat alone almost won Germany the war, as acknowledged by Churchill himself.

Not even close. Blair discussed this at length in his books. The U-boats interdicted something like 1 or 2% of all traffic to England. They never stood a chance. Even during the "Happy Time" tonnage available to England increased thanks to managing the fleet, ship transfers, etc.
 
Not even close. Blair discussed this at length in his books. The U-boats interdicted something like 1 or 2% of all traffic to England. They never stood a chance. Even during the "Happy Time" tonnage available to England increased thanks to managing the fleet, ship transfers, etc.

I'll concede the point presently as I'm not really well versed in it. However Churchill's quote of... " the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril". Has me more than intrigued and warrants further investigation. I do know that Germany started the war with far fewer U-Boats that they themselves said they needed in order to be successful.

Besides, I need to conserve my resources to battle you over the Montgomery debate. 8-)
 
I'll concede the point presently as I'm not really well versed in it. However Churchill's quote of... " the only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril". Has me more than intrigued and warrants further investigation. I do know that Germany started the war with far fewer U-Boats that they themselves said they needed in order to be successful.

Besides, I need to conserve my resources to battle you over the Montgomery debate. 8-)

Blair and I think Michael Gannon are both perplexed by the comment. In WWI U-boats were close to strangling the UK, but not in WWII. Was it public perception that drove Churchill, memories of WWI and the fear it could happen again? I don't know. Even in 40-41 they were only stopping 1-2% f all merchant traffic to the UK. In '42 they put a dent in US shipping, but their main influence was diverting technical and manufacturing resources to fighting the U-boat threat. The Germans were very good but they had bad torpedoes and not enough boats (Doenitz and Raeder fought over Type VII vs. Type IX construction and Plan Z. 7's were ideal for the north Atlantic and 9's for raiding the US or African coasts, but Doenitz wanted 7's because they could stay close to the UK and turn around faster, particularly after bases were established in occupied France. 9's were slow divers and wilted in the face of ASW efforts.)

U-boats and the Battle of the Atlantic are scary stuff until you break down the numbers. That's when you see it was a more emotional threat than physical.
 
Still off the OP, but the U-boat war, and the Battle of the Atlantic were the perfect picture of terrorism. You simply never knew if your particular allied vessel would make it safely to port; for a brief period of time, the "Happy Time", tonnage claimed by German U-Boats was worry some. The decision to travel in protected convoys were the first move to protect allied shipping. Improvements in ASDIC, and Sonar began to take the advantage away from the U-Boats, and it brought the end of the "Happy Time". The real damage to the U-Boats came from above. In the Bay of Biscay, it was the worst; and it was the only route in and out of the pens in Lorent France. Even there, the U-Boat pens took a huge pounding. In an attempt to gain an edge on the threat from the bombers, the Germans began using radar to find the dreaded bomers before they fell upon the hapless U-Boats. This was used not only in the Bay of Biscay, but in the open Atlantic as well. There was a huge, unseen risk with their radar use. The danger was that the signal the German radar units emitted to find any aircraft, could be picked up by allied aircraft. Once the Allies fell upon the signal the Germans were using with their radar, every time they activated the U-Boat's radar, they gave away their position. That cost the Germans huge losses in their U-Boat fleet. The "Happy Time" was a distant memory, and more and more U-boats went out, and simply never came back.
 
more and more U-boats went out, and simply never came back.

I broke down the numbers of U-boats, lost on their first patrol, lost without sinking anything, etc. I thought I posted it somewhere on the board. If not I'll try to find the spreadsheet.

The only number anyone needs to know is 75 as in "75 percent of U-boat crewmen were casualties." Some historians place the number at 80%.
 
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