Contact: When Everything Goes Right, 2/2/71

[Gunz]

One of those rare times when everything goes right, the bad guys die, the good guys walk away unscathed and get a case of beer delivered by the Wingers.

This is the original entry in the 2nd Combined Action Group Command Chronologies (from the Texas Tech Archives, for 2 February 1971. I've broken down into component parts and relate the actual events underneath. There are some discrepancies in the numbers in the entry.

...CAP 2-7-10 patrol...

Sunny, hot, humid, about 1300hrs. 10th Platoon, 7th Co, 2nd Combined Action Group, receives intel from its Kit Carson Scout (VC defector), that a small enemy force has been seen in the open just west of the Song Vinh Dien river. Six Marines and their Navy Corpsman, led by Sgt Elmer Thomas, accompanied by six South Vietnamese Regional Force counterparts, gear up and go mobile toward the suspected enemy position. Using cover and concealment, they maneuver into position in a treeline where they observe seven enemy personnel, with weapons, sitting in a clearing near what appears to be a tunnel entrance, eating rice. Sgt Thomas orders a machine gun team and two RFs to hook right in a flanking/blocking move to cover the river bank to the east.

...initiated OWF on (3) VC in a treeline at grid BT 045645...

The remaining Marines and their Counterparts open fire with rifles at seven VC at a range of approximately 40 yards.

...The VC return SAF and fled E across river...

Four VC are immediately shot dead, two grab their weapons and return fire while a third VC dives into the tunnel entrance. One of the defending Viet Cong is shot dead; the other, wounded, disappears down the tunnel entrance. The machine gun team and its Counterparts, having moved into a position to observe the river, see two individuals swimming. After ascertaining that no friendlies are in the river, the MG team opens fire, killing the swimmers.

...A sweep of the area disclosed (5) VC KIA, (2) VC POWs, (2) AK-47 rifles, (1) M-16 rifle, (6) M-26 grenades, and (1) tunnel complex which was blown...

Five VC are dead in front of the tunnel entrance. Two more are dead in the river. After a sweep, two badly wounded VC are discovered in the treeline between the tunnel entrance and the river and are taken prisoner. The WIA POWs are removed to a safe area where they can be attended to by the CAP Corpsman.

The MG team and Counterparts sweep the riverbank and discover a tunnel exit dug into the riverbank two feet underwater. Purple smoke grenades are then thrown into the tunnel entrance which is then covered by a poncho. After a time the smoke drifts up the tunnel air-vents in the treeline deliniating the extent of the complex. C4 charges are place down each air vent and the complex is blown.

...A further search of the blown complex revealed (2) VC KIA, (1) M-16 rifle, and (1) NVA flag. Two CAP RFs were WIA minor during the contact...

The RFs were treated by the CAP Corpsman.
_______________________________________

Nobody got hurt bad. We got bods, we got POWs and we got beer. Sometimes, things go the way they're supposed to, sometimes Murphy stays home.

 

[Ooh-Rah]

Freeking love when you post this stuff....

 

[Grunt]

Keep 'em coming brother!

 

[RackMaster]

@Ocoka Brother you seriously need to write a book. Love your stories.

 

[CDG]

As always, thanks for sharing Brother.

 

[Gunz]

The organizational structure of our company was fairly unique. The company headquarters compound was centrally located and the seven individual Combined Action Platoons that comprised the company each had their own operational areas (AOs) that radiated outward from that central hub like the web of a spider. Each platoon's AO was about 4 or 5 square kilometers, probably contained at least one small hamlet or ville, and a variety of terrain, ranging from rice paddies to jungle.

The Company Compound was small. Plywood huts and sandbagged emplacements surrounded by a mine field, barbed wire and an earthen berm topped with sandbags. The only supporting fire available from the compound were the mortars. The compound was home to a small headquarters detachment: The CO, the XO, the Company Gunny, several supply and admin personnel and some ARVN counterparts. These were responsible for the defense of the compound although nearby CAPs could be called upon to run foot react if necessary.

Officer's Quarters, 7th Company, 2nd CAG


The company compound featured an outdoor shower, a plywood hooch that served as an E/NCO/O club and served frozen pizza and beer, everything powered by generator. There was no host country infrastructure here, no electricity, no running water. The club was the main attraction. Each night, one Marine from each CAP in the company could come to the compound for 24-hour R&R before returning to the bush. If you were there, you were also expected to defend the compound which was a not an infrequent target for rocket and mortar attacks...but you could eat pizza and drink beer. And for us, a night behind sandbags and barbed wire and sleep on a mattress was like a night in a hotel.


L/Cpl "Marty" Martinez, out of the bush for well-earned 24-hour R&R


1st Lt Charlie Grebenstein, XO; Capt Jim Ivey, CO


Each Combined Action Platoon in 7th Company contained anywhere from 8 to 12 Marines and a Navy Corpsman. Each was led by a second-tour Sergeant E5, most of the CAP Actuals having served their first tour in rifle companies. All personnel in the Combined Action Program were volunteers, each had above average GCT and rifle range scores. No CAP stayed more than 12 hours in one location. All of them went mobile before dark, moving through pre-designated checkpoints before occupying their night ambush positions.

The CAPs were well armed. Each had one M60 Machine gun, two M79 grenade launchers, the rest carried rifles, M26 frags, C-4, Claymores, LAAWs rockets, bayonets and Kabars. There were two PRC25 tactical radios in each CAP, enabling the platoon to break into two elements, an Alpha Element, led by the CAP Actual, and a Bravo Element, led by the CAP Bravo, usually a Corporal with seniority. The PRC25s were the lifeline for an isolated unit. The only ground help available in an emergency would be a foot react from the nearest sister CAP, which, if it were at the farthest reaches of its AO, could take upwards of an hour or more to reach the contact position.

Our Counterparts were ARVN militia. Each CAP was assigned a 15-to-20-man Regional Force ARVN infantry unit, and together, the Marines and ARVNs completed the "platoon". We trained and instructed them but depended upon their NCOs/Os to furnish us with advice on local political subtleties and help us maintain rapport with local civilians, who were, arguably, the best source for HUMINT about the activities of the local VC guerrilla units.

Our casualties were high. In a company that never numbered more than 130 Marines and Corpsmen, we lost 13 dead and more than 40 wounded during the last months of 1970 and the first 4 months of 1971. But we also accounted for more than 3 times our number in enemy KIAs.

Although the autonomous nature and isolation of the individual platoon made it vulnerable to any determined attack by superior forces, close air support and supporting fires were available on call...and the mechanism to initiate that support was in place and efficient. "All Alone in Indian Country" was our unofficial motto, but any one of us could bring an inferno down on our enemies at the pull of the chain.