The Current Commandant of the Marine Corps vs. ...all of the other former Commandants?

My outsider/ history nerd view has held that the Corps, like the 82nd, other Airborne units, and pre-9/11 Rangers are our nation's "door knockers." They put us in the fight and execute follow on missions to expand that beachhead/ air head, but anything beyond that is extracurricular; look at the last 20 years and you see a lot of extracurricular activity.

We're kidding ourselves if we think that any unit, conventional or SOF, can sustain all of its core mission sets with a high degree of readiness. There's only so much time in a year, and so much funding, to use for training.

"Near peer" (China, let's be honest) threats are forcing us to focus on mission sets we have largely ignored for two DECADES. The threat has changed, tech has changed, the terrain/ battlespace has changed, and we have to change accordingly.

Will the Commandant's vision survive history? The successful (Mahan) and unsuccessful (Douhet to an extent) alike have shaped warfare well beyond their years. The Marines and AFSOC have gone all in on a vision for 2030 and beyond. When people talk about using wargames to justify their decisions I roll my eyes so hard I get a migraine. Wargames tend to be absolute crap and even when they aren't the participants use them to justify decisions long since made.

Who knows, the Corps may be on to something. It may be a total failure, or it may have a path that with some tweaking a few years from now becomes cutting edge. Until German tanks steamrolled Warsaw, the US Army believed a "square" division was the key to success. Within a few years the Army transitioned to a basic formation that has survived longer than any other in our history.

The Army and Corps alike had some bad days before they figured out airborne and amphibious landings. The US Navy went from a third-rate carrier aviation force to the undisputed king of everything in about year. 2022 could be no different as we transition from a Forever War to a future war.

The Corps' changes seem odd to me if not wrong. I'm not in those discussions, I'm not a Marine, so this is all academic in my world. I hope 2030/ 2035 finds a new Commandant making bold changes because the current Commandant's vision was never needed in the real world.

The Marines are still a cult and will remain so until the end of time. I'm just glad they are our Scientologists, even if they gave up their tanks.
 
My outsider/ history nerd view has held that the Corps, like the 82nd, other Airborne units, and pre-9/11 Rangers are our nation's "door knockers." They put us in the fight and execute follow on missions to expand that beachhead/ air head, but anything beyond that is extracurricular; look at the last 20 years and you see a lot of extracurricular activity.

We're kidding ourselves if we think that any unit, conventional or SOF, can sustain all of its core mission sets with a high degree of readiness. There's only so much time in a year, and so much funding, to use for training.

"Near peer" (China, let's be honest) threats are forcing us to focus on mission sets we have largely ignored for two DECADES. The threat has changed, tech has changed, the terrain/ battlespace has changed, and we have to change accordingly.

Will the Commandant's vision survive history? The successful (Mahan) and unsuccessful (Douhet to an extent) alike have shaped warfare well beyond their years. The Marines and AFSOC have gone all in on a vision for 2030 and beyond. When people talk about using wargames to justify their decisions I roll my eyes so hard I get a migraine. Wargames tend to be absolute crap and even when they aren't the participants use them to justify decisions long since made.

Who knows, the Corps may be on to something. It may be a total failure, or it may have a path that with some tweaking a few years from now becomes cutting edge. Until German tanks steamrolled Warsaw, the US Army believed a "square" division was the key to success. Within a few years the Army transitioned to a basic formation that has survived longer than any other in our history.

The Army and Corps alike had some bad days before they figured out airborne and amphibious landings. The US Navy went from a third-rate carrier aviation force to the undisputed king of everything in about year. 2022 could be no different as we transition from a Forever War to a future war.

The Corps' changes seem odd to me if not wrong. I'm not in those discussions, I'm not a Marine, so this is all academic in my world. I hope 2030/ 2035 finds a new Commandant making bold changes because the current Commandant's vision was never needed in the real world.

The Marines are still a cult and will remain so until the end of time. I'm just glad they are our Scientologists, even if they gave up their tanks.

We really have to get a new “love” emoji.

When we were fighting for the United Fruit Company in Nicaragua in the years between the two world wars, whoever would’ve predicted that the Corps would swell to six reinforced divisions by 1945.

The CMC’s vision—right or wrong—will stand or fall by the whims of fate and the actions of our future adversaries.
 
We really have to get a new “love” emoji.

When we were fighting for the United Fruit Company in Nicaragua in the years between the two world wars, whoever would’ve predicted that the Corps would swell to six divisions by 1945.

The CMC’s vision—right or wrong—will stand or fall by the whims of fate and the actions of our future adversaries.

As a former Sailor, @AWP had me at "Mahan"...

Those six divisions were by necessity, and as they forming them they were figuring out how to disband them to get back to mandated manning levels.
 
As a former Sailor, @AWP had me at "Mahan"...

Those six divisions were by necessity, and as they forming them they were figuring out how to disband them to get back to mandated manning levels.

And who can predict with certainty that future circumstances won’t necessitate the formation of another heavyweight Marine Corps, if only temporary?
 
And who can predict with certainty that future circumstances won’t necessitate the formation of another heavyweight Marine Corps, if only temporary?

Absolutely. By nature these things cannot be predicted, but you can assign probability values, and I think all the branches have done a marginal job of doing that with national guard and reserve many levels and restructuring. But still, you never know when you have to swell from 'n' number to 'y' number, quick-like.
 
Absolutely. By nature these things cannot be predicted, but you can assign probability values, and I think all the branches have done a marginal job of doing that with national guard and reserve many levels and restructuring. But still, you never know when you have to swell from 'n' number to 'y' number, quick-like.

I agree. And there's still the possibility--the very real possibility IMV--of getting involved in another two-front war. Russia and China are potential mutual defense pact allies. We could find ourselves fighting the Russians in Europe, the Chinese anywhere in the South China Sea AO.
 
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I agree. And there's still the possibility--the very real possibility IMV--of getting involved in another two-front war. Russia and China are potential mutual defense pact allies. We could find ourselves fighting the Russians in Europe, the Chinese anywhere in the South China Sea AO.

My concern is that our shift from a "two war military" to a "one war military" will = a "no war military."

If we're so vested in deterrence for one conflict to prepare for a second, because we can't win both, means our adversaries will calculate when they can achieve their goals best. If China were to invade Taiwan after Russia were to miraculously perform better and invade Poland, we'd be forced to choose who to support and the political dithering of the appointees junior in their field would prevent us from acting decisively.

I'm concerned for the future- not because I think the military can't perform, but because I think our civilian leadership will fail us harder than they did in Afghanistan for 20 years...
 
My concern is that our shift from a "two war military" to a "one war military" will = a "no war military."

If we're so vested in deterrence for one conflict to prepare for a second, because we can't win both, means our adversaries will calculate when they can achieve their goals best. If China were to invade Taiwan after Russia were to miraculously perform better and invade Poland, we'd be forced to choose who to support and the political dithering of the appointees junior in their field would prevent us from acting decisively.

I'm concerned for the future- not because I think the military can't perform, but because I think our civilian leadership will fail us harder than they did in Afghanistan for 20 years...
I think our Generals are just as corrupt.
 
Interesting read. T&P seems to be publishing a series of take down pieces on this transformation.

Opinion | The Marine Corps' plan to redesign the force will only end up breaking it

Also, is rocket artillery actually an "expeditionary" capability?

In my opinion, the critical mistake of Force Design 2030 is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of Force Design 2030.

It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.

It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.
 
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In my opinion, the critical mistake of Force Design 2030 is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of Force Design 2030.

It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.

It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.

This was the biggest mistake of the whole war. Except maybe starting it in the first place.
 
In my opinion, the critical mistake of Force Design 2030 is that it assumes that future combat involving the Marines will conform to the capabilities of Force Design 2030.

It limits the Marine Corps' flexibility to adapt to different kinds of warfare.

It reminds me of Rumsfeld and his light footprint approach; assuming that what worked in the early phase of the Afghan War would be applicable to the Iraq War.
It makes varying degrees of sense depending on how much one buys into the active-duty Marine Corps intelligentsia's frame of mind, which is grounded mainly in ideas like those expressed by "The Kill Chain" and "Ghost Fleet." If those theses are fundamentally accurate, units like the Marine Littoral Regiment are much more useful to the joint force by providing a survivable "sensing" capability than an outright "lethality" measured in the ability to weight the main effort, integrate with armor, and cover maneuver with fires: a Marine platoon in the defense is incredibly difficult to kill -- but a Marine platoon that can also remain concealed for long periods of time (hence the push for foraging and the like) while collecting on enemy forces? Game changer.

Interestingly, there's also a rumor in my corner of the world that General Berger is being considered for a promotion. About the same time we started hearing this rumor (a couple months ago?) Senator James Webb -- Marine Captain in Vietnam and later Secretary of the Navy -- published a WSJ article that seems to have kicked off, or at least been the initial volley, for the other articles from earlier thread. What that means for the veracity of the rumor is anyone's guess.
 
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