The Current Commandant of the Marine Corps vs. ...all of the other former Commandants?

It makes varying degrees of sense depending on how much one buys into the active-duty Marine Corps intelligentsia's frame of mind, which is grounded mainly in ideas like those expressed by "The Kill Chain" and "Ghost Fleet." If those theses are fundamentally accurate, units like the Marine Littoral Regiment are much more useful to the joint force by providing a survivable "sensing" capability than an outright "lethality" measured in the ability to weight the main effort, integrate with armor, and cover maneuver with fires: a Marine platoon in the defense is incredibly difficult to kill -- but a Marine platoon that can also remain concealed for long periods of time (hence the push for foraging and the like) while collecting on enemy forces? Game changer.

I appreciate your views as someone involved in the process but not sure I'm buying into all of it. I think some of the criticism is justified while some, admittedly, may just be Old School resistance to change.

During the Vietnam war, the Corps was flexible enough to utilize three different tactical concepts: traditional rifle-platoon infantry operations and Combined Action units involved in FID and counter-insurgency operations comprising squad-size teams living in the bush 24-7 (the latter of which was my experience); as well as MEUs operating in other parts of the world. Over the years the Corps has expanded and contracted through force reductions and expansions to meet the demands of a particular conflict.

I admit I like the idea of the MLR, which I view as an evolution of the MEU/BLT. But why not retain at least one or two brigades of shock-force trained infantry which can also rotate through the MLRs and vice-versa?

Your sentence that I bolded just says Recon Platoon to me.

I confess I haven't read the books you name but am very familiar with James Webb and his views.
 
Your sentence that I bolded just says Recon Platoon to me.

I confess I haven't read the books you name but am very familiar with James Webb and his views.
Yessir. And while no one has written about it yet, I wouldn't be surprised to see an argument along the lines of "The Commandant is just re-making the Marine Corps in the image of his own sub-community and justifying it post-hoc." It's compelling, for me at least, just not persuasive.

Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books. But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.
 
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Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books. But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.

People believe what they want and then spend their energies defending their choices instead of actually learning and growing.
 
Yessir. And while no one has written about it yet, I wouldn't be surprised to see an argument along the lines of "The Commandant is just re-making the Marine Corps in the image of his own sub-community and justifying it post-hoc." It's compelling, for me at least, just not persuasive.

Only a handful of people I've met in the past couple years actually have read the books. But refusing to intellectually adhere to the tenets themselves is becoming increasingly iconoclastic.

I've put them on my reading list, and thank you.
 
I appreciate your views as someone involved in the process but not sure I'm buying into all of it. I think some of the criticism is justified while some, admittedly, may just be Old School resistance to change.

During the Vietnam war, the Corps was flexible enough to utilize three different tactical concepts: traditional rifle-platoon infantry operations and Combined Action units involved in FID and counter-insurgency operations comprising squad-size teams living in the bush 24-7 (the latter of which was my experience); as well as MEUs operating in other parts of the world. Over the years the Corps has expanded and contracted through force reductions and expansions to meet the demands of a particular conflict.

I admit I like the idea of the MLR, which I view as an evolution of the MEU/BLT. But why not retain at least one or two brigades of shock-force trained infantry which can also rotate through the MLRs and vice-versa?

Your sentence that I bolded just says Recon Platoon to me.

I confess I haven't read the books you name but am very familiar with James Webb and his views.
There is one MLR now. Two regiments, one infantry and one artillery, are transitioning to MLRs in the next 2-3 years. The rest are largely unchanged.
 
The Marine Corps is headed for a pilot exodus

Interesting article. But the whole pilots fleeing in droves to commercial airlines is a bit overblown. And just because you fly a jet doesn't mean those hours qualify either. My BiL, solid guy, was relegated to being an instructor in Pensacola following a deployment at sea. No idea what happened but sometimes we get bad supervisors that screw us. Well he liked the Pensacola lifestyle so much that he chose to do the reserve instructor idiocy.

And he flies for SW but thinks FedEx might be hiring him soon. Always looking for green grass.
 
The Marine Corps is headed for a pilot exodus

Interesting article. But the whole pilots fleeing in droves to commercial airlines is a bit overblown. And just because you fly a jet doesn't mean those hours qualify either. My BiL, solid guy, was relegated to being an instructor in Pensacola following a deployment at sea. No idea what happened but sometimes we get bad supervisors that screw us. Well he liked the Pensacola lifestyle so much that he chose to do the reserve instructor idiocy.

And he flies for SW but thinks FedEx might be hiring him soon. Always looking for green grass.

No branch is keeping pilots right now. I don't know if the Marines' issues are better or worse than the Air Force and Navy in that regard.

I belong to Popasmoke, a Marine aviation organization (I'm a legacy because my father was with HMLA-167 and I did some SAR work with VMR-1), that sounds like the Marine aviation community morale is pretty crappy right now.
 
That's a great change of dynamic. Not really 'new' in that they've been experimenting with different grouped elements, and it makes sense.

I wish I could go back in and go to that unit.
God Bless the Sergeant in the article, but also, bless his heart. All his quotes read straight out of corporate sales documents. I just don't buy any of it.

"Oh, because we now have only two fire teams it makes it easier to do hip pocket training"
 
God Bless the Sergeant in the article, but also, bless his heart. All his quotes read straight out of corporate sales documents. I just don't buy any of it.

"Oh, because we now have only two fire teams it makes it easier to do hip pocket training"

The reality is the Marines have been doing stuff like that for a long time, just not embedded in doctrine. I did laugh out loud at the hit pocket training thing though. When I read it, I said to myself, "I'm not a boot..."

It does change the dynamic quite a bit, there's a whole lot more flexibility in this than the field manual doctrine.
 
I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.

Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.

Who knows? Maybe this squad reorg lasts for a few years until the Corps uses it in our next in a series of ongoing wars; the Corps learns then kills the concept. Maybe the Corps is proven right and this becomes its new standard. What's really interesting is they've set up squads as mini platoons.

I still think dumping tanks was a dumb idea, especially when your anti-armor is now...a LAV or something? Ugh.
 
I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.

Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.

Who knows? Maybe this squad reorg lasts for a few years until the Corps uses it in our next in a series of ongoing wars; the Corps learns then kills the concept. Maybe the Corps is proven right and this becomes its new standard. What's really interesting is they've set up squads as mini platoons.

I still think dumping tanks was a dumb idea, especially when your anti-armor is now...a LAV or something? Ugh.

As long as they're designing vehicles around unit size and not squad size around vehicle size like the other green service...
 
I kind of see where they are going with this. While I've never used a boat, if the Corps think this will make boat..."stuff" easier...and this is a littoral unit, then that makes sense.

Historically, the Corps has been slow to change. Either because of an entrenched corporate mentality, lack of funding, whatever...you don't think of the Corps as being progressive.

Who knows? Maybe this squad reorg lasts for a few years until the Corps uses it in our next in a series of ongoing wars; the Corps learns then kills the concept. Maybe the Corps is proven right and this becomes its new standard. What's really interesting is they've set up squads as mini platoons.

I still think dumping tanks was a dumb idea, especially when your anti-armor is now...a LAV or something? Ugh.

Somewhere between the company level and...somewhere else...there is a big invisible wall regarding progressive tactics and strategy. Maybe its commander-influenced; in my experience we were encouraged to 'toss the book.' But you are dead on regarding the Corps as a parochial organization bound by organizational inertia. I have also been told 'no, because we've always done it that way.' That's gotten me in trouble; some day I will tell you the story on why an E4 doesn't call the O6 on the phone to talk about changes to a curriculum.

Ironically I think it is lack of funding that encourages more progressive thought: you have to do more with less. The Corps does have a history of that (MEUSOC concept, maneuver warfare, reorg of MAGTF, etc.).
 
... But you are dead on regarding the Corps as a parochial organization bound by organizational inertia. ... Ironically I think it is lack of funding that encourages more progressive thought: you have to do more with less. The Corps does have a history of that (MEUSOC concept, maneuver warfare, reorg of MAGTF, etc.).

That's it exactly. The way we want to design the future force is: conceptual capability -> people -> systems -> training and education over time. It's a logical, intuitive model that works well for service-level planning.

But because of money, it turns into systems -> capability -> people -> training and education, and nothing stifles innovation more quickly than being told on the one hand to "adapt and overcome" given the gear you have in order to meet mission, and on the other (by someone else) that you can't do any of the things you're trying to do. I have no first-hand knowledge of this but I suspect that (1) the tank "system" was just too expensive to maintain considering all the other stuff we're trying to do, and (2) people were just tired of dealing with the contracting system associated with tanks.

The up-front cost of buying a LAV or a radio, for example, is nothing compared to the money we spend on its maintenance. At battalions, we can't "fix" radios and certain parts of the LAV (even though we have Marines whose entire MOS is designed to do just that, and even though we have the facilities to do just that) beyond wiping them down with a damp cloth (really) until we send it to a higher echelon of maintenance. And if we are able to do the maintenance, the process of ordering replacement parts is so long that if an LAV breaks, there's a decent chance we won't be able to train with it again for 6-12 months. Also, most of the solutions we come up with for service-level problems (emissions control, old-school fieldcraft and camouflage, littoral command and control equipment) would "technically" be "illegal selective interchange." Put a super cool civilian-off-the-shelf antenna system on a program-of-record vehicle? Not without a waiver from high up. I can't imagine the bureaucracy associated with experimenting the tank systems to meet the problem sets we're facing right now.
 
So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft. But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments.

Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...

U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News
 
So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft. But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments.

Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...

U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News

The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?
 
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