The Current Commandant of the Marine Corps vs. ...all of the other former Commandants?

Marauder06

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I never served in the Marines and haven't paid close attention to this issue. But when literally every one of your living predecessors comes out publicly against you, then it may be time to re-evaluate...

The roster of personalities includes every living former commandant, along with a slew of other retired four-star generals revered within the Corps. And all of them are bristling at different aspects of foundational changes introduced by Commandant Gen. David Berger, who aims to make the Corps lighter, faster and more capable of doing everything from electronic warfare to sinking ships at sea.

How two dozen retired generals are trying to stop an overhaul of the Marines
 
There's a bunch old guys yelling at clouds afraid of change and then there's...this. It always seemed to me that the Corps has the right idea, but was taking it too far. I'm also not a Marine or in those discussions so...

An interesting development all the same.
 
Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".

Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch:

One of the group’s more vocal forward-facing members, Vietnam vet Bing West, wrote in a recent article that urban battles taking place in Ukraine, and similar fights in Vietnam like Hue City and Fallujah in Iraq prove the need for tanks and heavy armor in modern combat. Without them, Marines “today are less capable than two decades ago.”

Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is to both well armed ground troops and UAS fire. I know the Russians are real shitty with using/defending their armor assets, but I'd love to see a better explanation of how more tanks would be helpful.
 
Flag officers in the Marines is an exclusive and small group, and very much a go-along/get-along club. Not my opinion; I believe that was in a book I read about Marine GOs since WW2. As a fraternity they are not about rocking the boat so it seems as if (this part is my opinion) one of the flock drifts, the rest of the flock bleat about it until that goat is back amongst them, or gone. I think (again, my opinion) is that is because the institutional paranoia of Corps leadership about having manning and funding taken away due the politicking of other branches.
 
I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this.

I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.

The Marine Corps that I belonged to—that I wanted to belong to since age eight—was different things. It was big and Iwo Jima bad on one hand… and on the other hand, the one I experienced, it was small unit Banana War-style counter-insurgency warfare.

I just hope the Corps eventually finds an identity that keeps it relevant.
 
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Are these generals just resisting change? Is Berger trying to make the Marine Corps just a fast-food version of SOF? I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this. But I think it’s a little bit of both.

I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.

The Marine Corps that I belonged to—that I wanted to belong to since age eight—was different things. It was big and Iwo Jima bad on one hand… and on the other hand, the one I experienced, it was small unit Banana War-style counter-insurgency warfare.

I just hope the Corps eventually finds an identity that keeps it relevant.
The Marines will always be relevant. How many Army units want to spend 6 months at sea? Seriously, join the Marines, and you know ARG time is coming.
MARSOC was force fed by Rumsfeld. Deservedly so.
 
Are these generals just resisting change? Is Berger trying to make the Marine Corps just a fast-food version of SOF? I’d be interested to hear @Teufel s take on this. But I think it’s a little bit of both.

I’ve always believed that the (special operations capable) Battalion Landing Team, the self-contained, self-supporting MEUs were and are the most unique option in the USMC arsenal. A compact fast-reaction force with everything it needs to hit hard at a Crisis point and hold the line.

The Marine Corps that I belonged to—that I wanted to belong to since age eight—was different things. It was big and Iwo Jima bad on one hand… and on the other hand, the one I experienced, it was small unit Banana War-style counter-insurgency warfare.

I just hope the Corps eventually finds an identity that keeps it relevant.
Sensing in the littorals is relevant. You can’t optimize operations in a budget constrained environment without taking cuts though. CMC is being bold. Most of his critics didn’t change much when they had his job. It’s his turn to lead and he owns the risk for what happens next. That’s how command works.
 
The MLRs sound like enhanced redesigned versions of MEUs. The MEUs and the maritime/amphibious capabilities are what sets the Corps apart, then and now. It’s right to emphasize that traditional role.

It was the main focus of my units post-Vietnam. Most everything we trained for involved maritime operations: amphib assaults from landing craft in Cuba; on amtraks in Vieques from our LPD; vertical envelopment in Virginia from LPH3, the old Okinawa, 53s outbound, 46s inbound. I was a range NCO at Little Creek, giving organic weapon fam fire for USNA midshipmen, and other Navy personnel.

It was all about that traditional relationship with Navy.

Pretty hard to maintain that role when your fighting in land-locked desert and mountain regions for 20 years or door-kicking in places like Fallujah.
 
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The MLRs sound like enhanced redesigned versions of MEUs. The MEUs and the maritime/amphibious capabilities are what sets the Corps apart, then and now. It’s right to emphasize that traditional role.

It was the main focus of my units post-Vietnam. Most everything we trained for involved maritime operations: amphib assaults from landing craft in Cuba; on amtraks in Vieques from our LPD; vertical envelopment in Virginia from LPH3, the old Okinawa, 53s outbound, 46s inbound. I was a range NCO at Little Creek, giving organic weapon fam fire for USNA midshipmen, and other Navy personnel.

It was all about that traditional relationship with Navy.

Pretty hard to maintain that role when your fighting in land-locked desert and mountain regions for 20 years or door-kicking in Fallujah.

We see these articles from time to time about doing away with the Marines and absorbing them into the Army or some such scheme. My argument is, has been, that the MEU concept is one of the things that sets the Corps apart: yeah, but the 82nd Airborne can deploy within 'X' hours. Yes, but they have to have Air Force aircraft to do it. The MEU is packaged in a way and with organic capability built in to render it different than anything the Army has or can do.

I don't like everything CMC has done (to be fair, he didn't ask me); I am still burning about doing away with my beloved 8th Marines. But he has been bold, and he seems convinced it is The Way.
 
Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is
Armor is always vulnerable in urban terrain if the enemy has the right tools, but I don't think you can use the Russians as an accurate gauge. IMHO its more telling of the quality of equipment, leadership, and the preparedness of their troops. As with any war in history, there are lessons to be learned.
 
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Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".

Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch:



Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is to both well armed ground troops and UAS fire. I know the Russians are real shitty with using/defending their armor assets, but I'd love to see a better explanation of how more tanks would be helpful.
Eh, Tanks in Urban battlefields have a massive place.

What we're seeing in Ukraine shows you how unsupported tanks with incompetent officers and ncos gets your ass handed to you. Saying they're susceptible in an Urban battlefield is like saying infantry is susceptible in urban terrain.

Clearly Russia's IPB was trash.
 
Eh, Tanks in Urban battlefields have a massive place.

What we're seeing in Ukraine shows you how unsupported tanks with incompetent officers and ncos gets your ass handed to you. Saying they're susceptible in an Urban battlefield is like saying infantry is susceptible in urban terrain.

Clearly Russia's IPB was trash.
UK artillery has been having a field (artillery) day with Russian armor outside urban areas.
This war may actually convince a ton of folks that the A-10 force can be reduced a bit.
 
The Soviet’s export business is taking a hit right now. Also, the war has a lot going on for lessons learned.
 
Almost every single argument I've seen from these retired generals is heavily steeped in comments of "Traditional role of the Marine Corps" or arguments that having fewer but more advanced assets will hurt capabilities because "more is better".

Like, the comments from Bing West in regards to Ukraine really seem out of touch:



Literally the biggest thing being shown in Ukraine is how susceptible armor is to both well armed ground troops and UAS fire. I know the Russians are real shitty with using/defending their armor assets, but I'd love to see a better explanation of how more tanks would be helpful.

As much as I respect Bing West, he’s wrong. The “traditional” role of the Marine Corps is not Hue or Fallujah, it’s not large scale urban combat or armored warfare…it’s serving aboard navy ships and conducting landing operations, raids and expeditions from those platforms. The Corps has beefed up its capabilities as situations warrant from war to war, but they have all been add-ons.

Far from breaking with “tradition” the CMC wants to return to a modernized version of the Marines original role. And that means that the add-ons are no longer options. The Army will be tasked with any combat requiring tanks from now on and the Corps will stay on and off shore. This probably means a smaller role for the Marine Corps in future conflicts…and maybe that’s why these generals are grumbling.
 
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