Navy ship collisions thread from 2017

There's Danger in Garcia's Message | U.S. Naval Institute

The root problem is that the “Message to Garcia Mentality” is so deeply embedded in Navy culture that we are blind to it at the most dangerous levels of the Navy’s leadership

Regarding the findings of the USS Fitzgerald on the toxicity of Message to Garcia within Naval leadership.

I didn't realize it was such a staple and my experience with the essay from my SOF leadership had nothing to do with taking risks, but more to do with initiative in completing tasks.

Seems like deflection to me, but maybe I'm misunderstanding the intent.
 
This is not directed at the OP.

Is the US Navy being lead or managed? How could decide if the USN or any branch is being managed or lead? Which is better, management or leadership?

I wonder if the Garcia of today would have been less concerned about his job. Garcia of today might be more concerned about how he looked, ecological damage his passing might have on the flora and fauna, and taken the time to be sure the message was properly formatted and politically correct.

IMHO, leadership has been seen as a liability in the military since the time of POTUS Bush 41.

My $.02.
Slight disagree/
IMO it started with those that survived the VN era purges became risk averse.
Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 43, Obama continued the cut while we fight mentality.
 
Yeah, there were changes when Carter was in. Controlled OER's began, and pilots began leaving in droves. I was at Andrews at the time and the Squadron that flew AF One even started leaving. Things seemed to settle back down again under President Reagan. I got out while Bush 41 was in, and the change to management was in very solidly by then.
Forgot about Carter, his they can leave if they don't like it quote opened a floodgate.
 
There's Danger in Garcia's Message | U.S. Naval Institute



Regarding the findings of the USS Fitzgerald on the toxicity of Message to Garcia within Naval leadership.

I didn't realize it was such a staple and my experience with the essay from my SOF leadership had nothing to do with taking risks, but more to do with initiative in completing tasks.

Seems like deflection to me, but maybe I'm misunderstanding the intent.
The author is missing the mark. A message to Garcia encourages perseverance, creative problem solving, and mission accomplishment in the face of adverse circumstances. I would argue that the Navy may talk a lot about "message to Garcia" but in reality they promote a zero defect mentality that strongly discourages action and initiative at any level. Especially in the surface warfare officer corps.
 
- UPDATE -

In both cases....who the hell was in charge of the freeking bridge?

Full Report

Navy Releases Collision Report for USS Fitzgerald and USS John S McCain Collisions

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- The Navy released Nov. 1, a report detailing the events and actions that led to the collision of USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan June 17, and the collision of USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and merchant vessel Alnic MC Aug. 21.

"Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watch standers that contributed to the incidents, said Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson. "We must do better."

USS FITZGERALD
The collision between Fitzgerald and Crystal was avoidable and resulted from an accumulation of smaller errors over time, ultimately resulting in a lack of adherence to sound navigational practices. Specifically, Fitzgerald's watch teams disregarded established norms of basic contact management and, more importantly, leadership failed to adhere to well-established protocols put in place to prevent collisions. In addition, the ship's triad was absent during an evolution where their experience, guidance and example would have greatly benefited the ship.

USS JOHN S. MCCAIN
The collision between John S. McCain and Alnic MC was also avoidable and resulted primarily from complacency, over-confidence and lack of procedural compliance. A major contributing factor to the collision was sub-standard level of knowledge regarding the operation of the ship control console. In particular, McCain's commanding officer disregarded recommendations from his executive officer, navigator and senior watch officer to set sea and anchor watch teams in a timely fashion to ensure the safe and effective operation of the ship. With regard to procedures, no one on the Bridge watch team, to include the commanding officer and executive officer, were properly trained on how to correctly operate the ship control console during a steering casualty.
 
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