The Current Commandant of the Marine Corps vs. ...all of the other former Commandants?

The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?

For what ever reason I was expecting there to be some coordination regarding stratekgery around keels being laid to support the Corps in their idea for transformation. And I don't know why I thought that would be the case. Just found it interesting that the Navy is getting rid of craft that would have likely been used to support a littoral regiment.

I supposed I was being a silly goose.
 
So, the Navy is getting rid of the Mark VI. And the Marine Corps is testing small combatant craft. But I do find it interesting that this transformation is happening but it really requires cooperation of the Navy to provide boats and ships for the Littoral regiments.

Again, maybe getting rid of tanks was a bad idea...

U.S. Navy’s Mark VI and 40-foot Patrol Boat Updates - Naval News
The Marines have always depended upon the Navy for boats and ships. Why would Littoral operations be any different?

I believe their new 2030 transformation has them tooling around island chains a la McHale's Navy style (or We Were Expendable, your choice) and they want to be more independent with their littoral watercraft. I agree it appears that one hand isn't knowing what the other is doing with the Navy getting rid of a boat that might be helpful for the Marines, but who knows what is going on behind the scenes.
 
Considering the Navy only has 12, I doubt these would be of much use due to their density alone.
 
So they chopped forty feet off the new contract with MetalShark and got this.

40 Defiant | Metal Shark

One the one hand, they are meant to patrol harbors (according to the Navy). On the other hand...what the chicken fried fuck?

I'm gonna' spitball here and say the Navy isn't committed to this littoral warfare thing. Maybe it is putting its eggs in the FF(X) basket and drones? I don't know, it seems dumb to this outsider.
 
One the one hand, they are meant to patrol harbors (according to the Navy). On the other hand...what the chicken fried fuck?

I'm gonna' spitball here and say the Navy isn't committed to this littoral warfare thing. Maybe it is putting its eggs in the FF(X) basket and drones? I don't know, it seems dumb to this outsider.

I think the Navy is committed to getting the Marines to the fight, especially in light of requesting funding for more amphibs. However, my sense in reading the articles put out by USNI is there just as happy to dump the Marines and haul ass a la Guadalcanal. I hope I am wrong in my interpretation.
 
I think the Navy is committed to getting the Marines to the fight, especially in light of requesting funding for more amphibs. However, my sense in reading the articles put out by USNI is there just as happy to dump the Marines and haul ass a la Guadalcanal. I hope I am wrong in my interpretation.

Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.

Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.

If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.
 
Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.

Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.

If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.

Fletcher said he had to refuel...but I think in truth he was worried about losing his carrier (and his career). Considering the heavy losses the Navy had sustained it's understandable if commanders were gun shy. The Japanese Navy was still immensely powerful even after the drubbing at Midway--as they were soon to prove in surface actions in the Slot. So, maybe Fletcher gets a raw deal in history.

Still, it looked like bugging out...and he left a mess on the beach.
 
Guadalcanal was such a bad look for the Navy, but I wonder how much of that decision took root going forward to now. History has proven it to be the wrong decision, but that's revisionist history which is sketchy at best. How many commanders given the information at the time would stay? I can't fault the Navy even if we know it to be the wrong decision because we weren't there.

Good, bad, or other, at some point we have to trust the combatant commander. It's a delicate line, but we can't neuter the guy/ gal in the field. Hate it or not, but decentralized command and control is a hallmark of American fighting prowess.

If our risk adverse nature removes that from the table then...I hope it works out. And hope is not a method.

"Risk averse nature" I think is what it is and why I brought up Guadalcanal (not to make a 1:1 comparison). Based on what I have read from USNI and the shifting doctrine in the Pacific, with the Corps transitioning to holding islands and being in contested areas, it seems that the Navy is OK with putting them ashore and getting out of the area, supporting with drones/UAVs and missile fires. That said, the Marines have a multi-generational leap of tech to play with now. They are not necessarily beholden to 8" guns 10 miles off shore or needing a blocking force.

Anyhoo, that's just my feeling reading the articles. I could be wrong. It's 1018, and it would not be the first time today I would be wrong.
 
The Navy's primary concerns are carrier, submarine, and destroyer... not L-class ships to send Marines or employ Marine assets.

CMC made the pivot because a pivot had to be made. We got sloppy and over-committed to the GWOT - our state adversaries took advantage of this and they are maneuvering well through what is an arms race of capabilities & world-wide influence.

Good news is we can accomplish in a few years what our adversaries can't accomplish in a decade because they simply don't have our caliber of troop.

Marine Corps is gonna Marine Corps no matter what the Marine Corps is at any given time.

And if you understood that, you're probably a Marine.
 
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The Navy's primary concerns are carrier, submarine, and destroyer... not L-class ships to send Marines or employ Marine assets.

CMC made the pivot because a pivot had to be made. We got sloppy and over-committed to the GWOT - our state adversaries took advantage of this and they are maneuvering well through what is an arms race of capabilities & world-wide influence.

Good news is we can accomplish in a few years what our adversaries can't accomplish in a decade because they simply don't have our caliber of troop.

Marine Corps is gonna Marine Corps no matter what the Marine Corps is at any given time.

And if you understood that, you're probably a Marine.

The Marine Corps can, and has, 'pivoted' (buzzword bingo), better than any branch. Part of it is size, part if warfighting philosophy and doctrine, part of it is the "we're perpetually underfunded and do more with less so screw you" attitude.

Personally, I like the concept of the MLRs and the plan for the pacing threat, and you are right in that it was gonna happen, and best for CMC to drive that than it being forced upon the Corps.

RE: Navy concerns, agree that the priority is the warfighting ship. Especially in light of the news lately about the state of the existing fleet and readiness. But if the Corps is going to execute its 2030 plan, it needs boats, and that mission is part of the Navy, so priority or not they need to find a way to fix it.
 
So, I'm trying to figure out how you keep the school trained Sniper capability at the Recon and Marsoc level without a school? Does that mean these Marines will just attend Army sniper school?

Marine Corps Axes Elite Scout Sniper Platoons


No doubt @Teufel will have more insight on this.

I'm assuming the Designated Marksman still exists at squad or platoon level? And scout-sniper capabilities will be taught as an adjunct during the Recon or Marsoc pipeline? I doubt the Marines need to send anybody to Army schools when it comes to rifle courses.
 
No doubt @Teufel will have more insight on this.

I'm assuming the Designated Marksman still exists at squad or platoon level? And scout-sniper capabilities will be taught as an adjunct during the Recon or Marsoc pipeline? I doubt the Marines need to send anybody to Army schools when it comes to rifle courses.

DM to remain a capability. To be frank that's where this is strange. The Scout Sniper course is 3 months. The Army course is a bit less. However, this commandant loves trimming a lot of fat...however, I would call this bone. Considering the idea of the "littoral" regiment. The scout sniper capability would seem to nest there. But oh well.
 
I shoot with a few former SS. They are apoplectic, sent me this, from a civilian website deleted.

I don't disagree that there needs to be some changes. I am curious if pushing this entirely to MARSOC/Recon is the right choice, and if their schools will host non-MARSOC/Recon guys, and if they will continue to have the separate DM school in Virginia. The memo does have some ambiguity and is unclear.
 
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