Devildoc
Verified Military
About 5, 6 pages on things that are WAYYYYYY beyond my mental calibration. BLUF for me: if it's wrong, corrective action (in whatever form) and drive on. Don't obfuscate, deflect, lie, or ignore.
The Trump Presidency 2.0
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We use Signal a ton. Always been told it's secure but we shouldn't send anything that would be considered any level of "controlled/classified" over it.
I’d have to dig up the email, but CUI has to go through Teams. No alternative apps were provided so we’ve taken that to mean Teams is the only approved platform.
Blizzard
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Holy cow. I'm so far behind on this spillage story. This thread has gotten away from me as well.
Are we still basically at the point where NSA and SECDEF are downplaying the severity of this issue and looking for new shiny objects to refocus everyone's attention? Or is there more to it now?
On a different note:
Are we still basically at the point where NSA and SECDEF are downplaying the severity of this issue and looking for new shiny objects to refocus everyone's attention? Or is there more to it now?
On a different note:
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@amlove21
Gonna caveat that this information is available to anyone with web access, so it's nothing special.
The information must fall within one or more of the categories of information listed in E.O. 13526,Sec. 1.4. These are the eight categories of information eligible for classification:
(a) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations
(b) Foreign government information
(c) Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods,
or cryptology
(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources
(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security
(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects,
plans, or protection services relating to national security
(h) The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
And if you click here, page 16 and 17 are great reading for what information would qualify for classification.
As @AWP pointed out, a system HAS to be accredited for CUI. For example, accessing OWA from your personal laptop and pulling up emails with PII is an absolute no-go. All that U//FOUO stuff everyone use to keep on their personal laptop...not authorized. Accessing SIGNAL from your government phone, also not authorized because SIGNAL isn't accredited. At worst, this whole issue is classified collateral secret, and at best, it's an unauthorized disclosure of CUI. You cannot convince me otherwise that this is unclassified information and fit for the public domain. Bottom line, it's a spill.
INFOSEC is a game of risk mitigation, and ultimately, risk acceptance. You brought up earlier the hypothetical operational environment overseas and the methods and resources you could be stuck with to get the mission done. If you don't figure out, you fail. Risk accepted. Got it. I 100% understand the circumstances and that the environment dictates the COA. The problem is this isn't that. If I was the security manager responsible for that office I would be throwing shit across the room right now. The response that SECDEF gave is absolutely not how you make this go away, now look where they're at.
The journalist, love him or hate him, held all of the cards. And continues to do so. So...SECDEF comes out, smirks on camera and begins to shit all over this dude's character, stating this was all fake news, he can’t be trusted, etc. After all of that, he simply ends it with "nobody was texting war plans". The WORST thing you could ever possibly say is "I can neither confirm nor deny" because all you're doing is confirming. You simply say, I know nothing about that. By ending that interview with that statement he confirmed the message chain existed. Good job. And then by shitting all over this guy, he’s angry. Then the administration starts to double down saying everyone was fine and that no classified information was released and OPSEC wasn't violated. And just so we’re clear, OPSEC is a method of analysis to identify critical information. You can't tell me with a straight face that hit times and operational resources on an upcoming strike aren't classified, or even OPSEC. Anyways, now they say the info was good for public release, because it wasn’t the above, he releases it…
The appropriate response to this shit is “hey, we know an individual might’ve made it into a chat thread where sensitive information may have been revealed. We’re looking into it and will conduct a full analysis. We will make a determination on how to move forward following the results of that analysis.”
AND THEN YOU FLY SOMEONE TO THE FUCKING JOURNALIST AND TAKE HIS PHONE and then you figure out how far it went. And then you slap an NDA in fucking front of him and say sign. And then we take a second, breath, and move on. You don’t make it a point to call this dude out so he doubles down on the story.
SECDEF is way out of his element and I think the mountain he needs to climb to get there is just too steep.
ETA: And do I think the conversation should've been had on Signal? No, I don't, but I get it. The risk of compromise to the mission was minimal, if not non-existent, and they accepted that risk. I believe they are in positions to do that. The introduction of extreme risk came when they introduced homeboy to the chat. The thing that pisses me off the most isn't what happened, but how it was handled, or rather, wasn't handled.
ETA2: This would've been over had this been the initial response.
Gonna caveat that this information is available to anyone with web access, so it's nothing special.
The information must fall within one or more of the categories of information listed in E.O. 13526,Sec. 1.4. These are the eight categories of information eligible for classification:
(a) Military plans, weapons systems, or operations
(b) Foreign government information
(c) Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods,
or cryptology
(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential
sources
(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security
(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects,
plans, or protection services relating to national security
(h) The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
And if you click here, page 16 and 17 are great reading for what information would qualify for classification.
As @AWP pointed out, a system HAS to be accredited for CUI. For example, accessing OWA from your personal laptop and pulling up emails with PII is an absolute no-go. All that U//FOUO stuff everyone use to keep on their personal laptop...not authorized. Accessing SIGNAL from your government phone, also not authorized because SIGNAL isn't accredited. At worst, this whole issue is classified collateral secret, and at best, it's an unauthorized disclosure of CUI. You cannot convince me otherwise that this is unclassified information and fit for the public domain. Bottom line, it's a spill.
INFOSEC is a game of risk mitigation, and ultimately, risk acceptance. You brought up earlier the hypothetical operational environment overseas and the methods and resources you could be stuck with to get the mission done. If you don't figure out, you fail. Risk accepted. Got it. I 100% understand the circumstances and that the environment dictates the COA. The problem is this isn't that. If I was the security manager responsible for that office I would be throwing shit across the room right now. The response that SECDEF gave is absolutely not how you make this go away, now look where they're at.
The journalist, love him or hate him, held all of the cards. And continues to do so. So...SECDEF comes out, smirks on camera and begins to shit all over this dude's character, stating this was all fake news, he can’t be trusted, etc. After all of that, he simply ends it with "nobody was texting war plans". The WORST thing you could ever possibly say is "I can neither confirm nor deny" because all you're doing is confirming. You simply say, I know nothing about that. By ending that interview with that statement he confirmed the message chain existed. Good job. And then by shitting all over this guy, he’s angry. Then the administration starts to double down saying everyone was fine and that no classified information was released and OPSEC wasn't violated. And just so we’re clear, OPSEC is a method of analysis to identify critical information. You can't tell me with a straight face that hit times and operational resources on an upcoming strike aren't classified, or even OPSEC. Anyways, now they say the info was good for public release, because it wasn’t the above, he releases it…
The appropriate response to this shit is “hey, we know an individual might’ve made it into a chat thread where sensitive information may have been revealed. We’re looking into it and will conduct a full analysis. We will make a determination on how to move forward following the results of that analysis.”
AND THEN YOU FLY SOMEONE TO THE FUCKING JOURNALIST AND TAKE HIS PHONE and then you figure out how far it went. And then you slap an NDA in fucking front of him and say sign. And then we take a second, breath, and move on. You don’t make it a point to call this dude out so he doubles down on the story.
SECDEF is way out of his element and I think the mountain he needs to climb to get there is just too steep.
ETA: And do I think the conversation should've been had on Signal? No, I don't, but I get it. The risk of compromise to the mission was minimal, if not non-existent, and they accepted that risk. I believe they are in positions to do that. The introduction of extreme risk came when they introduced homeboy to the chat. The thing that pisses me off the most isn't what happened, but how it was handled, or rather, wasn't handled.
ETA2: This would've been over had this been the initial response.
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ThunderHorse
Verified Military
Let's roll back to June 2012, I'm in the schoolhouse, the new commander takes over. He makes the class leader download whatsapp, he only communicates to him through whatsapp. Class leader then emails us all on our Army.Mil accounts which to get to was a pain in the ass even with the supplied computers.
Florida173
SOF Support
Out of any real context from that message from the SECDEF, I don't really know who is doing what to whom and where. I honestly was thinking Goldberg was gonna show some legit CONOPs or something, but instead he just mentions the info being in their high-side emails and then provides some mission updates. Something that journalists in the past would have been privy to with an embargo on when they could share. Not knowing who was in that chat is the biggest mistake and definitely amateur hour. But I'd say retrain on the OPSEC violation and move on.
Also, we've been using Signal as a primary comms platform for a very long time. Especially since Wickr went away.
CNN has a good roll-up of the text chain. The who is definitely in there. The aggregation is certainly worth considering, too.
Annotating the Trump administration's Yemen war plans from their Signal group chat
Florida173
SOF Support
definitely tracking all of it together being the at least the where. as far as specific targets and which units or anything though. It still seems a bit sparse
Which explicitly states Signal is not authorized.
Despite the spillage, more and more how this happened and how it was handled is the bigger deal. Clean on OPSEC...wow.
Florida173
SOF Support
Great example of Shadow IT because provided systems suck.. but that's a DOD policy for the down and in, not for the up and out. Was it an OPSEC violation or spillage. I say really neither because it wouldn't even pass as a legit BUB. All I know are some F-18s did a thing in the CENTCOM AOR. Context suggests Yemen and Houthis, but that doesn't really help. Also some behind the scene discussions on policies.
If it's spillage, meaning actually classified and would do serious damage to National Security, than anyone here that has read it on their personal computers are more in violation, and let's hope you don't read it on NIPR or AVD. Also if classified, who do you think had OCA for it, if not the SECDEF.
I'm not really a fan of ms Loomer, but the more that comes out about Waltz's staffer that added Goldberg to the chat the more bizarre this gets. I usually like saying "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence," but maybe there was actual malice here?
@GOTWA thanks for that roll up dude, I really appreciate it.
@Florida173 I am pretty close to your camp on this one. I think with all things considered, it's an issue that needs a strong response and I don't care if anyone uses their jobs over it.
Do I think it's a mountain made from a molehill? Also yes, but that's the game. It's a misstep your adversary is gonna capitalize on, from a political strategy standpoint I am sure I'd feel more aggressive about it in the inverse.
@Florida173 I am pretty close to your camp on this one. I think with all things considered, it's an issue that needs a strong response and I don't care if anyone uses their jobs over it.
Do I think it's a mountain made from a molehill? Also yes, but that's the game. It's a misstep your adversary is gonna capitalize on, from a political strategy standpoint I am sure I'd feel more aggressive about it in the inverse.
In case anyone was wondering why Trump and the current unelected Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney; haven't talked yet.
House Committee Says It Finds Evidence of ‘Climate Cartel’
Terry Newman: Mark Carney's plan for global climate domination
House Committee Says It Finds Evidence of ‘Climate Cartel’
Terry Newman: Mark Carney's plan for global climate domination
So where are we collectively on sedition charges for Goldberg, the signalgate reporter? He burned a CIA dude and published national secrets (if I am reading the assessments correctly).
Seems like a slam dunk.
Seems like a slam dunk.
I thought he kept the CIA operative out of it?
The one Ratcliffe said was His Cheif of Staff, not a currently serving operative.
to the broader sedition charges; it feels like a catch-22 for the administration.
Squaring the circle of "it's no big deal, but also this guy publishing it was leaking national secrets" is a tall order because of how it's been handled so far.
They had a chance to control the narrative like @GOTWA suggested but blew it.
IMO going after Goldberg just gives the story even more legs and makes it a bigger deal.
It's an interesting scenario, really. You have Hegseth and crew that are adamant that it was nothing, so you can't go after the guy for posting nothing. They'll look like real assholes if they admit that it really wasn't nothing. Then you have the other side that says it's absolutely something, in which case homeboy needs some punishment. However, he posted it based off the response from Hegseth and crew, so can he be held responsible? Probably not.
Now, you want to talk about this whole Mike Waltz aide thing...whew.
In the famous words of @amlove21, I love this timeline.
Florida173
SOF Support
I will expect everyone that viewed this highly classified material to self report to their SSOs for viewing the spillage... /s
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