It's enlightening how people who have spent very long times interpreting the law (please read this as a rejection of the notion of "one true constitutional interpretation) lack intelligence when they don't end up with the same legal analysis as non-lawyers.
The legal question is: The Connecticut Supreme Court below held that the PLCAA’s predicate exception encompasses all general statutes merely capable of being applied to firearms sales or marketing. In contrast, both the Second and Ninth Circuits have rejected this broad interpretation of the predicate exception, which would swallow the PLCAA’s immunity rule. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 402-403 (2d Cir. 2008); Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1134, 1136. And the Ninth Circuit interpreted the predicate exception even more narrowly than the Second Circuit. See ibid.
The question presented is whether the PLCAA’s predicate exception encompasses alleged violations of broad, generally applicable state statutes, such as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, which forbids “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a).
Moreover, Conn. is fighting this as a State's rights issue if I read this correctly:
"Such use of the XM15-E2S, or any weapon for that matter, would be illegal, and Connecticut law does not permit advertisements that promote or encourage violent, criminal behavior. Following a scrupulous review of the text and legislative history of PLCAA, we also conclude that Congress has not clearly manifested an intent to extinguish the traditional authority of our legislature and our courts to protect the people of Connecticut from the pernicious practices alleged in the present case".
Docket for 19-168
