What’s happening in Iran?

It will be interesting to see the US and global response. In 2009 the Obama administration was criticized for not doing enough to support the protesters. There were even some who called upon the administration to send aid to the protesters including logistic support. In hindsight part of the administration's reluctance may have been the work they were doing on the Iran deal (JCPOA).

IMO (and I think the last administration's calculus) it's tough to 'aid' protests in an authoritarian country without falling directly into the narrative of the regime - allowing them to justify increased repressive measures on grounds of 'foreign' interference. Of course, they're still going to repress the protesters and claim foreign interference (real or imagined) but it helps with diplomatic options and public opinion to have truth on your side.

Still, will be interesting to see if the current administration actually acts out those policies they criticized the Obama administration for not taking. I wonder if it won't prove to be an effective way to scuttle JCPOA.

The strategic argument for JCPOA in simple terms was that Iran has a young population that overwhelmingly wants reform, no theocracy, and improved economic growth/opportunity/western commerce (the jokers that are protesting now). But, Iran has a powerful, entrenched authoritarian regime. The Obama administration, through JCPOA and other measures sought to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the near term (10 years) while avoiding conflict and making the US and the west continue to be an appealing ally for the emerging generations in Iran who would gradually take power through internal politics. All while avoiding the regime's ability to build nationalist support through external conflict. It was always a tricky dance - and was predicated on the idea future administrations would continue the broad outlines of the plan. With the current administration who knows what will happen.

Another interesting thing I've read about the 2009 protests - and may apply to the current ones - is that it displays both the strength and weakness of social media 'resistance.' The crux of the argument goes that social media makes it easy to organize massive protests and generate large organizational structures for political action. However, because social media makes it easy the political organizations that arise do not have the depth, strength, or organization to truly affect change - they can draw big crowds for a few weeks but can't play the long game. In contrast, political 'resistance' organizations like the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt have had to spend time in prison, live in hiding, publish literature, build a political organization in difficult circumstances - and thus have a better long game.

I'm not sure where I fall on the argument. It makes logical sense but I wonder if it's fair to grade the political organization of young generations at their start - vs after they've had time to mature.
 
Another interesting thing I've read about the 2009 protests - and may apply to the current ones - is that it displays both the strength and weakness of social media 'resistance.' The crux of the argument goes that social media makes it easy to organize massive protests and generate large organizational structures for political action. However, because social media makes it easy the political organizations that arise do not have the depth, strength, or organization to truly affect change - they can draw big crowds for a few weeks but can't play the long game. In contrast, political 'resistance' organizations like the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt have had to spend time in prison, live in hiding, publish literature, build a political organization in difficult circumstances - and thus have a better long game.

Is the lack of "staying power" because of social media or because the participants don't have a physical sense of participation? Social media and something like prison are vastly different beasts. With SM one can distance themselves (to a certain degree) from reprisals unlike prison. If you're imprisoned you have no choice but to play the long game, whereas social media offers a lot of "outs" for lack of a better word.

To me, social media means you can run your mouth without total commitment, but something like prison where physical danger and hardship are present.... that's as real as it gets. Social media allows distance at (usually) minimal cost.
 
It seems to me that this is an area--selective and creative manipulation of SM--that US intelligence can play a role. I am sure we aren't the only country being hacked by foreign governments.
 
If it comes to a head, bullets beat iPhones every time. It's one thing to join your pals in a street party and vent your frustration. It's another when your pals start disappearing.

It might however be an opportunity to expand our HUMINT capabilities inside Iran.
 
Is the lack of "staying power" because of social media or because the participants don't have a physical sense of participation? Social media and something like prison are vastly different beasts. With SM one can distance themselves (to a certain degree) from reprisals unlike prison. If you're imprisoned you have no choice but to play the long game, whereas social media offers a lot of "outs" for lack of a better word.

To me, social media means you can run your mouth without total commitment, but something like prison where physical danger and hardship are present.... that's as real as it gets. Social media allows distance at (usually) minimal cost.

The arguments I remember hearing (or at least the way I processed them) were a criticism of the organizational structure itself less than the individuals. The ease of social media organizing is more akin to flash mobs. You can get a lot of people in a general sense, but far less for sustained, skills-based, effort. So, you can get a protest - but you struggle with message discipline, agreed tactics, strategy, wielding any power/authority you are given, etc. In some ways the '99%' protests are a good precursor - lots of sound and fury that couldn't translate to discernable political outcomes.

But, I think your critique of individuals and how they participate in terms of depth, commitment, expertise, etc. is also valid.

Of course, we've got two examples from the Arab spring of a series of protests ultimately building to armed resistance - Libya and Syria. In both cases the zeitgeist of public opinion might have been on pluralistic democracy but the elements that could remain disciplined and effective fighters were overwhelmingly Islamist and Salafist. It would be an interesting academic case with real-world applications to understand why.

Hey @Marauder06 - need recommendations for your dissertation?
 
Some of the Iranian military/militia would have to take their weapons and join the protests in order for this to turn into a conflict with real teeth. What are the chances of that? I doubt the military has much freedom to engage in social media so the rank and file might be somewhat out of the loop for the short term..

But in '78, the protests against the Shah led to general strikes that culminated in a strike by oil workers that pretty much shut down the economy...And then it was the Army high command that started to reach out to the protest leaders.

It's possible if the state of unrest continues to worsen, the same thing could happen again. The question is, would it have the drive and intensity of that earlier revolution necessary to sweep enough of the trigger-pullers along with it?
 
Last edited:
It looks to have been implemented by the hard liners oddly enough and has gone in a different direction entirely.
The lack of clear leadership has apparently spooked the regime as they can’t point the finger and arrest leaders.
 
Some of the Iranian military/militia would have to take their weapons and join the protests in order for this to turn into a conflict with real teeth. What are the chances of that? I doubt the military has much freedom to engage in social media so the rank and file might be somewhat out of the loop for the short term..

But in '78, the protests against the Shah led to general strikes that culminated in a strike by oil workers that pretty much shut down the economy...And then it was the Army high command that started to reach out to the protest leaders.

It's possible if the state of unrest continues to worsen, the same thing could happen again. The question is, would it have the drive and intensity of that earlier revolution necessary to sweep enough of the trigger-pullers along with it?

My understanding of the 2009 protests - at least in urban areas like Tehran - the regime was very careful about what security forces they employed. At that time they did not roll out the army - possibly for fear of their ties to the populace (I believe it's a largely conscript force). Instead they employed police, internal state security, and a militia they keep for this purpose called the 'Baseej' (which I may have spelled incorrectly). My understanding is the baseej is essentially like the brownshirts were for Nazis - recruited, ideological thugs who rarely wear uniforms and can be counted upon to inflict violence and terror under the protection of internal security forces and regime propaganda. When not breaking up protests they act like a semi-official militia for internal security and 'morality police.'

I haven't seen anything on the baseej and their use in this round of protests - but I'm assuming it's the same model as 2009.
 
Last edited:
If Soleimani is in fact dead, it's good news for the West in the long term, as it deprives Iran of "the most powerful operative in the Middle East today." But Soleimani is revered inside of Iran, having risen from his humble peasant roots to the head of the largest and most active terrorist-sponsoring organization in the world. He earned his way up by battling some of Iran's toughest foes: Kurds, Iraqis, drug dealers, Israel, ISIS, and various militias inside Lebanon. He is a hero to Iran, and his "martyrdom" at the hands of America will drive an intense desire for revenge, and may even help distract average Iranians from the political dissent that has been percolating in Iran for some time now.

Some people are even speculating that this might be some kind of "Archduke Ferdinand" moment for Iran, which will strengthen the current regime and plunge the region into a conflagration of violence. What that will ultimately result will be, no one yet knows. But it is likely that dramatic attacks against US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as against Israel. It's also not outside the real of possibility that attacks against US interests at home could even be targets, either kinetically or via cyber. Increased vigilance for the next couple of months would be a prudent move for everyone.

Stay frosty, friends.

Iran smoke flag.jpg
 
Reuters

Why did he feel safe enough to travel to BIAP? Did he not think US/Israeli assets weren't watching his every move, waiting for him to step outside Iran?

I think this is huge and I'd expect Iran to respond.
They also got Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was the commander of the PMC (up until a few minutes ago). I don't know exactly what the various militias thought of AAM, but the hard-core ones are going to flip their shit over Soleimani getting capped.

Don't get me wrong - Hajji Qassem was a rat bastard and huge piece of shit, but if this doesn't drag us into a shooting war with Iran then I'll be very surprised.
 
Back
Top