Florida173
SOF Support
To turn NAIs into TAIs
What Is The Purpose of Intelligence?
- Thread starter Marauder06
- Start date
LongTabSigO
Verified SOF
Let me know when we plan on discussing this at above the battalion level.
Florida173
SOF Support
Sounds great, but I think it gets a bit more convoluted at the operational and strategic levels. As in how the G/J2s out there are broken into different types of teams generally doing CT or PolMil stuff. Most of the stuff is for situational awareness anyway because of the speed the intelligence goes down is no where near as quick as the collection assets at the Battalion level and below.
PolMil?
Florida173
SOF Support
Yeah... Think PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information systems), or even DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military and/or Economic)
PolMil is just Political and Military analysis at usually a Strategic or Operational level.
I don't think DIMEFIL is an effective model any longer. I'm thinking about writing a paper about it. Maybe a separate thread for that later.
I should have defined the parameters of the discussion better, it may be more useful to ask "what is the purpose of intelligence at the strategic level," and "what is the purpose of military intelligence" as two separate questions.
I should have defined the parameters of the discussion better, it may be more useful to ask "what is the purpose of intelligence at the strategic level," and "what is the purpose of military intelligence" as two separate questions.
LongTabSigO
Verified SOF
(1) I find it interesting some seem to think that the presence or absence of systems/assets, or the level of command changes the nature of intelligence. I'd submit that for any definition of "the purpose of intelligence" to be valid, it must apply at any level.
(2) Please...do not make up a new acronym. DIME/DIMEFIL/MIDLIFE really covers it. For those who are not acquainted with these terms: These are elements of national power, so I doubt you'll come up with another acronym that will materially enhance this concept.
(3) Lets's stop throwing around acronyms/buzzwords. We were doing way better when we were trying to capture the essence of this topic with tightly written prose.
(4) Also: "POLMIL" means political-military, but is not to be construed as only as, or primarily as, a form or manner of analysis. "POLMIL" applies to any topic regarding political and military actors.
LongTabSigO
Verified SOF
DIMEFIL does not accurately sum up the elements of organizational influence- it completely omits racial, ethic, and religious elements- clearly, these can be instruments of national power as much as any of the others.
The big difference was my addition of the mention of "initiative". To define the purpose of intelligence in a way that can apply at any level, a writer must grapple with just exactly how to nail down the wording so that it encompasses a myriad of assets, while addressing them in a very broad way. Since "facilitating the accomplishment of the mission" is something that every military unit is tasked with, the verbiage I proposed is a way of narrowing down the scope and focus of what all intelligence assets would / should concern themselves with by adding a careful mention of this profound word. In other words, it takes the textbook definition, and places it on a war footing. The original definition is vague.
To highlight my point, other military units facilitate the accomplishment of the mission, but do not necessarily contribute to the commander or planner in a way that affects the ability to seize (or hold or deny) initiative. Supply and logistics, for instance, would be one facet of (any level of) the military which would be vital to any mission small or great, and yet play only a limited role in the ability of (any level of) forces to seize the initiative, hold it, or deny it from the enemy, other than perhaps rudimentary interruptions or delays. Batterys of LAAD might be another example of military units/assets which, under certain circumstances may be vital to a given mission, and yet not contribute to the seizing of initiative (although they might certainly deny the enemy the ability to sieze it).
The contribution of intelligence assets, by comparison, can give a commander the ability to decide to act or refrain from acting in such a way as to force the enemy off balance. And with a steady stream of quality intelligence, the commander or planner can then capitalize on earlier actions, and develop a[n operational] tempo; this would be one in which enemy forces are given no choice but to react to our activities. Whichever side is causing the other to react is the side which has the initiative, and therefore the advantage. A commander who can string together a sequence of these cycles will control the AO. At the highest levels of war planning, commanders can exert a great deal of control on the outcome of engagements when he can dictate the time, place, duration, and nature of those engagements, as well as the selection of units to be employed (i.e. placement of armor, prepositioning of other forces, etc.). This is my understanding of the concept of initiative, and I feel it deserves a place of preeminence any time there is a mention of intelligence, and especially when defining the very purpose of it.
Last of all, I'll throw in a single high profile example of a well known mission that demonstrates how intelligence can uniquely give a commander the initiative. In my view, it also illustrates how this instance involved action and interaction from the squad level to the division level. Without too much detail, I remind you of the Desert Storm feint when CENTCOM essentially sent a SEAL element/squad to place distraction devices and explosives onshore, in a successful effort to deceive 2 Iraqi Armor Divisions into believing that a Marine Amphibious Assault was underway. From feeding disinformation to Iraqi forces, to movement of friendly forces offshore, to the Special Operations forces which carried out the mission, this was an instance where all the right pieces came together. Knowing that Iraqi commanders were anxious about the possibility of an amphibious assault, knowing how they would likely react, and the using this information in order to force a reaction, CENTCOM was able to directly influence a huge force, paving the way for access elsewhere with little resistance. (For an interesting read on a little publicized aspect of this particular feint, and how the mainstream media inadvertantly assisted US forces, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA258285)
LongTabSigO
Verified SOF
This bears its own thread, lest it hijack this one. You're going to have to show me how the three elements you name rise to the level of elements of national/state power. I look forward to that.
Color me dubious, but I do not see how you can leap from the recognized elements of national power to add factors that probably
LongTabSigO
Verified SOF
JBS typed:
The phases of operations are thus:
Shaping Phase
Deterrence Phase
Seizing the Initiative Phase
Dominance Phase
Stabilization Phase
Enabling Civil Authority Phase
As depicted, "seizing the initiative" is but one phase. Including it in the definition we are debating would greatly compress the scope. These other phases have different focuses. The concept of "initiative" applies in vastly different ways in the "Shaping" or "Stabilization" phases as compared to the "Seize initiative" or "Dominance" phases. (Your examples trend toward these latter phases). Could we include "initiative"? Sure. But I'm not sure how it is additive to the existing, very thoroughly staffed and debated definition currently in doctrine. Could I "live with it"? Sure.
I'm purposely parsing here because this is a frustratingly difficult thing to codify. Unless one has participated in doctrinal or joint task review, it is difficult to appreciate the degree of detail and nuance that these type of efforts require. That said, I agree that doctrine is always the point of departure from which leaders train and lead their forces. Nothing saying the ideas here could not be applied in specific cases.
This is interesting.
The phases of operations are thus:
Shaping Phase
Deterrence Phase
Seizing the Initiative Phase
Dominance Phase
Stabilization Phase
Enabling Civil Authority Phase
As depicted, "seizing the initiative" is but one phase. Including it in the definition we are debating would greatly compress the scope. These other phases have different focuses. The concept of "initiative" applies in vastly different ways in the "Shaping" or "Stabilization" phases as compared to the "Seize initiative" or "Dominance" phases. (Your examples trend toward these latter phases). Could we include "initiative"? Sure. But I'm not sure how it is additive to the existing, very thoroughly staffed and debated definition currently in doctrine. Could I "live with it"? Sure.
I'm purposely parsing here because this is a frustratingly difficult thing to codify. Unless one has participated in doctrinal or joint task review, it is difficult to appreciate the degree of detail and nuance that these type of efforts require. That said, I agree that doctrine is always the point of departure from which leaders train and lead their forces. Nothing saying the ideas here could not be applied in specific cases.
This is interesting.
I've been thinking about this thread some more, and based on what we discussed here and some of the research I did on my own I came up with this:
The purpose of intelligence is to enable “decision advantage” by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and prevent surprise, and to prevent the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection.
This definition adds "decision advantage" and includes the CI aspect of intel that I think was kind of overlooked in earlier definitions.
The purpose of intelligence is to enable “decision advantage” by disseminating timely, accurate, predictive and contextualized assessments of the operational environment in order to provide early warning and prevent surprise, and to prevent the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection.
This definition adds "decision advantage" and includes the CI aspect of intel that I think was kind of overlooked in earlier definitions.
Brill
SOF Support
I think you need another conjunction in there somewhere. :-"
I would argue that the prevention of "the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection" is actually a security function (opsec, comsec, physec) more so than intel.
I would argue that the prevention of "the compromise of intelligence products and the sources and methods of collection" is actually a security function (opsec, comsec, physec) more so than intel.
Opsec is an ops function, that's why it's "opsec" and not "intsec" ;) Intel has a role in opsec, but opsec is not an intel function. Intel does, however, have CI, which is why I put the italicized portion in the definition.
Brill
SOF Support
Damn Sir, have you been to 'gator school because I'm not sure what you just said but I think I'm ready to agree! Maybe...perhaps...
'gator school is one of the only schools at Huachuca I didn't get to go to. Well, of the ones I wanted to go to, anyway.
OPSEC really is an ops function, intel guys get saddled with it a lot because 1) ops guys don't want to do it, 2) it has "security" in it, so it MUST be an intel function, 3)the S3 has tasking authority, so even though it's not an intel function, "stfu and do it anyway, because I told you to." ;)
OPSEC really is an ops function, intel guys get saddled with it a lot because 1) ops guys don't want to do it, 2) it has "security" in it, so it MUST be an intel function, 3)the S3 has tasking authority, so even though it's not an intel function, "stfu and do it anyway, because I told you to." ;)
Mara-
missing from your definition is ...the fostering of surprise for operations by the fighting force for whom you are gathering the raw information which after analysis and synthesis becomes intelligence.... I mean isn't good intelligence a force multiplier for the fighting force? A good field platoon with excellent intel can become an excellent field platoon, possibly an overwhelming field platoon; and yet the corollary is also true as an excellent field platoon with shoddy intel may be rendered ineffective.
but, hey, I'm just the Troll, y'know?
missing from your definition is ...the fostering of surprise for operations by the fighting force for whom you are gathering the raw information which after analysis and synthesis becomes intelligence.... I mean isn't good intelligence a force multiplier for the fighting force? A good field platoon with excellent intel can become an excellent field platoon, possibly an overwhelming field platoon; and yet the corollary is also true as an excellent field platoon with shoddy intel may be rendered ineffective.
but, hey, I'm just the Troll, y'know?
I like it- but you don't think that would fall under "decision advantage?"
Not really since decision advantage is part of command structure not the field operations (execution) portion. This is taking the highly honed reactive abilities of the fighters and adding steroids to the plan of attack through prescience - rather than reacting to a surprise right from an opponent they know the surprise right is an imminent conclusion and come under it with the left uppercut or coming at the opponent from an angle that renders the surprise right ineffective thus negating the presumed power of the opponent. The decision advantage was in the planning - the operational advantage is in the execution.
