Women in Combat Arms/ SOF Discussion

That day is perhaps close at hand. ;-):-"

Sperm created in lab


Edit: cite latest study

Don't I know it, Brother. I have seen this material.

Since I put out the teaser....my sis-in-law, 41, single, decided that since she hadn't met Mr. Right she would do embryonic adoption. Maybe she hasn't met Mr. Right because she is a fat cow of a sociopathic narcissist, but that's another story. So she gets shot up, has this kid, now declares to be "Mom and dad," no need of a man in her life, tells me and my wife that she is entirely of equal status to us. Nevermind she needs a full-time cook and nanny to dog-sit this kid, and will leave the kid while she steals away for "me time." But, hey, we are told she is "equal to any man".

In the guise of equal opportunity, under the veil of equality, women are eroding every sanctity of maledom in society. And it's NOT that they are trying to rise to the meet a standard to do it; in many cases, they are destroying standards in order to lower them so they can wear the glass slipper, er, combat boot. Then when that happens, they write the narrative on why it was right to do so and that those of us supporting standards are just knuckle-dragging troglodytes and misogynists.
 
For me, yeah, a little. Part of it is that there are so few bastions of pure, unadulterated manhood left. Part of it goes way deeper. While I think 95% (maybe more) of jobs/tasks don't require a man or woman specifically, there are some that just one gender or the other can do, should do or is called to do. Women moving into combat MOSs is just one more reason the male part of our species is being made obsolete in society.*

*I am sensitive to this because of relationships in my own family that are attempting to underscore the fact that men just aren't needed.
Were you an infantryman?
 
Check out the curriculum for Infantry Officer Basic Leadership Course (IBOLC, formerly known as IOBC). While it takes experience and effort to make a superior infantry officer, it's simply not that hard to train someone to be a competent infantry officer, and competency is what most TRADOC schools are looking for in new officers.

All pre-commissioning sources focus on infantry tactics as a vehicle for evaluating leadership ability and potential. Some do this more than others, some do it better than others, but if IOBC educates one to a bachelor's degree in "infantry," then many of the major ROTC programs, and certainly West Point, probably get their officers-to-be up to the associate's level prior to commissioning.

While it is usually true that someone who has been practicing a trade longer will be markedly better at it than a neophyte, the fact is that branch transfers happen regularly in the Army, and I can't think of any studies that show officers who have branch detailed or branch transferred perform less competently than officers who were purely of that branch. That definitely doesn't hold in my own experience.

Finally, much of BOLC is spent preparing infantry officers for the rigors of Ranger School. Presumably, someone who has already tabbed out of that school has sufficiently demonstrated the physical, mental, and tactical skills required for it.

Being that you spent your younger years as an Infantry PL, would you feel confident in taking over an Infantry btn tomorrow, leading them through a year long deployment to Afghanistan, several companies spread out over a large battle space, and if so, would you allow this young "tabbed" lady to lead one of those companies, with full confidence of command?
 
Were you an infantryman?

No, I was a corpsman. FMSS/FMTB (field med training, a Marine school) is co-ed and not particularly hard. Still, of the handful of the women in my class, about half had to be recycled because they just couldn't handle it physically.

To be fair I had no issue working with female corpsman when I was with a FSSG unit (logistics and mixed gender); but then, it wasn't particularly hard, even the field time. Of course, the infantry platoon was an entirely different matter, and it this perspective from which I come.
 
I'd like to invite the SecDef to put on a basic Infantryman's load, plus a ruck weighed out with enough to live on, plus M4, plus distributed extra ammo for the SAW/240, and hump up and down Atterbury with my unit for two solid weeks this summer.

Not moving tactically, not reacting to the inevitable occasional arty sim or any of the rest of it, just humping.

I would be surprised if one doesn't come to understand what one's about to ask our women to do, and what kind of physical damage they'll be dealing with for the rest of their lives, in the service of a social experiment.

Had something of a similar nature occur back during the Clinton era. We were at JRTC doing our rotation and my RTO gets a message the CO needs me on the horn ASAP. He tells me that some VIP's are heading my way, don't get bent out of shape and take care of business. I respond with "Roger, out." I didn't bother to ask him what was going on or who they were. I take a quick glance around the perimeter and everything is 5x5 as usual. A few minutes after that, a bunch of controller HMMV's stop short, and an entourage of people get out, and start heading in my direction.

A Colonel and Sergeant Major walk up and say "You must be Sergeant Centermass" I salute the Colonel and shake the CSM's hand. The Colonel then introduces me to Congress person Pat Schroeder. I shake her hand and the Col proceeds to explain that the good congress person is out here to observe training and talk with the troops. "No problem Sir" I respond. In the meantime, she's looking around, and beams in on my ruck. Without saying so much as a word, she reaches down and goes to pick it up.......she could barely budge it.

She then let's go, looks at me and says "Are they always this heavy?" "No ma'am" I responded, "Sometimes, they're heavier." She then, walked away shaking her head. Never said "Thanks" or "See ya" or talked to anyone else. The Sergeant Major had a grin on his face she couldn't see, as they made their way back to the vehicles.

This episode was back when it was initially suggested females be allowed to serve in Combat Arm roles while she was on the House Armed Services Subcommittee.

About an hour later, the CO gets on the radio and asks me how everything went. I said "I think she got everything she was looking for."
 
Being that you spent your younger years as an Infantry PL, would you feel confident in taking over an Infantry btn tomorrow, leading them through a year long deployment to Afghanistan, several companies spread out over a large battle space, and if so, would you allow this young "tabbed" lady to lead one of those companies, with full confidence of command?

I'm not fit to be an infantry battalion commander. There is too much operational art garnered in the field grade ranks prior to assuming battalion command for me to make that up with just BS and brainpower. It would be a disservice to the unit to have me as an infantry battalion commander.

That said, I'm quite confident that if the Army gave me a branch transfer and sent me to the MCCC and after a little staff time put me in front of an infantry company, like they did with CPT Griest, I'd do quite well. As I said before, in the company grade ranks it's just not that hard to be competent. A better example might be an armor company though, since I have zero experience with armor and ~ four years as an infantry officer. Either way, I'd happily command alongside a female infantry or armor company commander if she met all of the requirements.
 
I have every confidence that there are female officers who will perform competently in the Infantry branch.

Prep schools aren't equivalent to line unit leadership; I have always contended that IBOLC and Ranger school should be combined into one school for Infantry officers, though.


Female 11Bs, who will be spending many, many more years on the physical side of the job, are who I'm most concerned about.

Paying special attention to Section 10:
The Modern Warrior's Combat Load

IBOLC and Ranger School are functionally combined already, unless something has changed in the last few years. The normal path is IBOLC --> Ranger School --> Airborne School (sometimes RS and AS are reversed) --> unit. Too many people fail out of Ranger School for it to be part of the formal IBOLC curriculum; it would affect the number of available officers in line units.
 
I'm not fit to be an infantry battalion commander. There is too much operational art garnered in the field grade ranks prior to assuming battalion command for me to make that up with just BS and brainpower. It would be a disservice to the unit to have me as an infantry battalion commander.

That said, I'm quite confident that if the Army gave me a branch transfer and sent me to the MCCC and after a little staff time put me in front of an infantry company, like they did with CPT Griest, I'd do quite well. As I said before, in the company grade ranks it's just not that hard to be competent. A better example might be an armor company though, since I have zero experience with armor and ~ four years as an infantry officer. Either way, I'd happily command alongside a female infantry or armor company commander if she met all of the requirements.

Well put sir, and I would say that if CPT Griest spends some time on the staff side prior to assuming a company command it would be a smarter route. But honestly doubt she will be accepted or respected if she walks into a command with literally zero experience as an Infantry officer. Ranger school doesn't really give you credibility in the line company. In fact the first thing that normally gets brought up in a AAR when someone tabbed fucks up is "you've been to Ranger school we expect better" normally followed by a sarcastic mutter in the ranks like "black and gold for caution when following". Not that anyone disrespects the school its obviously one of the best and hardest in the world, it's that the soldiers will judge everything and everyone on their individual performance and not on the cool schools they complete.

With no experience everyone will see straight through her, and that will make things very challenging for her and the unit.
 
I'm not fit to be an infantry battalion commander. There is too much operational art garnered in the field grade ranks prior to assuming battalion command for me to make that up with just BS and brainpower. It would be a disservice to the unit to have me as an infantry battalion commander.

I think if you were assigned to an active BCT today, yeah, you wouldn't do well as an IN BN CDR - preparation and experience are too specific - just like I think most of those BN CDRs would make shit G2s or MI BN CDRs. But, I do wonder if you wouldn't do alright as an ARNG or RC maneuver CDR.

I'm not trying to shit on the ARNG or RC but one of the things that hampers organizations above the company level is the dearth of effective field grade officers in those components. It comes down to the operational and organizational experience you alluded to in your post. If I take an RC LTC with 18 years in, who was never AC and/or never deployed, they have less time physically wearing a uniform than you did as a CPT (38 days a year times 18 years = 684 days). This is exacerbated by the experiential and learning curve in training, organizing, and employing organizations above the company level. We have a strong tradition in the modern Army that those require deep experience - nobody puts the most brilliant LT or E4 of all time as the BDE CDR or CSM. Plus, look at the number of officers who hold multiple branches in the RC - more than a few BN and above CDRs didn't start out in those branches and have differing levels of full-time experience.

I get your point, but I think you could probably take an ARNG or RC BN tomorrow and be in the top 20% of CDRs. I guess my major point is we do have different standards in the force already - but we don't often criticize them because we don't want to insult fellow Soldiers we rely on and would be incapable of fulfilling our mission without.
 
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Well put sir, and I would say that if CPT Griest spends some time on the staff side prior to assuming a company command it would be a smarter route. But honestly doubt she will be accepted or respected if she walks into a command with literally zero experience as an Infantry officer. Ranger school doesn't really give you credibility in the line company. In fact the first thing that normally gets brought up in a AAR when someone tabbed fucks up is "you've been to Ranger school we expect better" normally followed by a sarcastic mutter in the ranks like "black and gold for caution when following". Not that anyone disrespects the school its obviously one of the best and hardest in the world, it's that the soldiers will judge everything and everyone on their individual performance and not on the cool schools they complete.

With no experience everyone will see straight through her, and that will make things very challenging for her and the unit.

I agree. I don't think she'll walk straight into command, it would be setting her up for failure and the Army won't allow that to happen. There are no "zero day recycles" in company command.

She'll spend some time in the command queue working on a battalion staff, probably as an assistant S3, and when it's her time she'll get her shot. I think she'll do just fine.
 
I think if you were assigned to an active BCT today, yeah, you wouldn't do well as an IN BN CDR - preparation and experience are too specific - just like I think most of those BN CDRs would make shit G2s or MI BN CDRs. But, I do wonder if you wouldn't do alright as an ARNG or RC maneuver CDR.

I'm not trying to shit on the ARNG or RC but one of the things that hampers organizations above the company level is the dearth of effective field grade officers in those components. It comes down to the operational and organizational experience you alluded to in your post. If I take an RC LTC with 18 years in, who was never AC and/or never deployed, they have less time physically wearing a uniform than you did as a CPT (38 days a year times 18 years = 684 days). This is exacerbated by the experiential and learning curve in training, organizing, and employing organizations above the company level. We have a strong tradition in the modern Army that those require deep experience - nobody puts the most brilliant LT or E4 of all time as the BDE CDR or CSM. Plus, look at the number of officers who hold multiple branches in the RC - more than a few BN and above CDRs didn't start out in those branches and have differing levels of full-time experience.

I get your point, but I think you could probably take an ARNG or RC BN tomorrow and be in the top 20% of CDRs. I guess my major point is we do have different standards in the force already - but we don't often criticize them because we don't want to insult fellow Soldiers we rely on and would be incapable of fulfilling our mission without.

The issues with ARNG field grade officers is not organizational capabilities or lack of experience for that matter. It's more so a lack of trust and ability to trust. And that is systemic from a lack of working operationally as Btn or Brigade size element. Most of that happens on a table top format until the Guard is activated. When that happens it requires time of gaining trust in people to perform their jobs from the top down. Any officer stepping into a guard BCT/BTN will suffer the same fait and growing pains. That's just the nature of the ARNG, partially due to the part time until deployed stuff, but also due to people being moved around regularly. Also due to a very harsh accountability environment that is very unforgiving. I've seen quite a few AD turned Guard Officers crumble under the stress and insanity that takes place in the BCT/BTN levels within the ARNG.

That said, I think your questions are valid, but lack understanding in capabilities. For example, the Guard is has better capabilities in the areas of low intensity conflict, stability operations, security operations, humanitarian operations, what used to be full spectrum operations, etc. Where we are losing alot of capability is in maneuver warfare or more to the point conventional large unit against large unit operations. We can do it, but we lack the training facilities, equipment and budgets, to be proficient at it (from what I'm told, so is the AD side). And honestly its just not the primary focus, as we are a multi mission force, with a state and federal mission that requires us to be always Gumby.

As for the individual experience levels within the ARNG, you would be absolutely shocked. Not only are most soldier (enlisted and officers) prior AD. But they also hold rank at much older and mature ages. They have been around for quite awhile. Another thing often over looked by AD soldiers is the civilian occupation experience many of these guys bring to the table. From corporate CEO's, MD's and small business owners, also serving as officers, to firefighters, cops, construction worker's, etc often filling the enlisted ranks. With people like that, you get a unique capability that is not often found in the AD side, which allows us to be alot more flexible, to take on different roles, like going from kicking doors in the middle of the night in one zone, to plumbing clean water to a village in another zone the following day. No special engineers needed, just can you do it, than get it done.

That all said, it all comes back to the time and trust development. You give a BCT/BTN enough time (normally 6-12 mths) and they will operate as efficiently as any other. The problem is when big Army wants extra boots, they don't want to afford that "gel time" and we end up spending a few months of a deployment still trying to gel. Which has led directly to unnecessary deaths of ARNG soldier's, specifically in my own platoon, more specifically my first TL, but that's a story for another thread.
 
People also forget the Guard isn't designed to activate and send off to war. The 6 week train-up preceding a deployment is too short IMO, but not something I've been through. I would look upon with some skepticism any claims that the Guard is as good as their AD counterparts. Sure, it is better in some regards, no doubt, but worse in others. Like any organization on the planet, it has inherent strengths and weaknesses. Our military leadership should have the courage to use it appropriately instead of treating it like a differently colored Lego block.

As discussed above, one key failure of the Guard is the inability to practice BDE level operations and even BN-sized ops are something for Annual Training because of the logistics involved in doing anything on the weekend. You also have BN's spread across the state and at best companies are within 3-4 hours of each other. Add that to limited training spaces and you have a recipe for massive shortcomings.

When you set aside politics the Guard's real strength lies in her CGO's and NCO's...ah, but Guard politics. I can explain it but unless you've seen them in action or felt their wrath you can't really know how crippling they are to the Guard.

I've always liked to think, and still do, that the Guard brings more breadth to the table and the AD side more depth. Neither is bad, they just have to be used properly. When they aren't the Guard loses out all day, every day, regardless of the circumstances. The Guard is a good, relevant tool, but you have to use the tool properly for it to be effective.
 
People also forget the Guard isn't designed to activate and send off to war. The 6 week train-up preceding a deployment is too short IMO, but not something I've been through. I would look upon with some skepticism any claims that the Guard is as good as their AD counterparts. Sure, it is better in some regards, no doubt, but worse in others. Like any organization on the planet, it has inherent strengths and weaknesses. Our military leadership should have the courage to use it appropriately instead of treating it like a differently colored Lego block.

As discussed above, one key failure of the Guard is the inability to practice BDE level operations and even BN-sized ops are something for Annual Training because of the logistics involved in doing anything on the weekend. You also have BN's spread across the state and at best companies are within 3-4 hours of each other. Add that to limited training spaces and you have a recipe for massive shortcomings.

When you set aside politics the Guard's real strength lies in her CGO's and NCO's...ah, but Guard politics. I can explain it but unless you've seen them in action or felt their wrath you can't really know how crippling they are to the Guard.

I've always liked to think, and still do, that the Guard brings more breadth to the table and the AD side more depth. Neither is bad, they just have to be used properly. When they aren't the Guard loses out all day, every day, regardless of the circumstances. The Guard is a good, relevant tool, but you have to use the tool properly for it to be effective.

The six weeks is bare bone minimum and that would be a unit deploying as a platoon or company element. Basically checking all the individual task blocks, some small unit tactic's/maneuvers specific to the mission, SRP, get on the plane. It really should be 90 days minimum for company and below, and 6 mths minimum for a Btn. A BCT really needs a full year.

As for "as good as" comments, its depending on the mission and train up. Both my deployments were as a Btn, both relieved AD Infantry Btn, both showed better success in mission accomplishment than the AD counter parts.

That said, they were missions we were specifically trained for, were unique to our capabilities and not for the AD guys. We took over battle space in 03, where AD made the push and basically pulled security, we got there at the beginning of the insurgency and conducted full spectrum ops (so we racked up all kinds of accomplishments that were not available to the AD unit). In 08 it was a convoy security mission, we simply did that better, less vehicle loses, more recovery's, more mission accomplished, meeting time hacks, etc.

So I agree but also view it through a different lens and understand the specifics of the mission, prep training specific to the mission, and the capabilities/flexibilities difference between AD and ARNG.
 
And just to be absolutely clear if you line a AD btn up against a ARNG Btn for a straight up conventional fight, AD will always kick our ass. We just don't have the facilities, equipment or time to be proficient at it, and its highly unlikely Guard will face that situation. Also keep in mind, during WW2 NG units received 2 years in training before deploying, and were staffed by a lot of AD officers.

ETA: besides 1/143 Infantry (Airborne), I'd put those guys up against any AD conventional battalion, and they would absolutely hold their own. $.02
 
@Il Duce , don't forget that many Guard bums actually work in their "MOS" in their civilian capacity too. Perhaps a civ manager is MORE effective at bureaucracy than an AD officer because he's driven by market forces rather than OER forces.
 
@Il Duce , don't forget that many Guard bums actually work in their "MOS" in their civilian capacity too. Perhaps a civ manager is MORE effective at bureaucracy than an AD officer because he's driven by market forces rather than OER forces.
No one in the Guard manages an infantry battalion in their civilian capacity.
 
No one in the Guard manages an infantry battalion in their civilian capacity.

No, but several AGR (active guard reserve) officers and NCO's do. But in my opinion it would be very different than what an AD staff does. Their focus is more the administration of the battalion for pay, training and personnel issues. It's basically a light staff and most issues are not immediate focus.

You also have several technicians, who are basically ARNG reservist who are paid a wage, but still perform their MOS in uniform. Also not something common in a infantry battalion (motor pool, weapons maintenance, IT, etc).

That said, most battalion commanders, CSM, and most staff officers are AGR in some format throughout the state. They may belong to XYZ unit, but work full time for a task forces, or a state command group, or up at the division level doing other staff responsibility's.

As posted before it's not really an experience issue with Guard officers, it's more of a working together, time to gel and develop trust, good old boy politics, etc.

Example: MG Kendall Penn was my battalion Cdr in 2003-2005 Iraq, he was AGR at brigade before the deployment, after he became the BCT Xo and Cdr, but was AGR at the state command as a COL, and than BG, commanded the brigade during 07-09 Iraq, returned and became AGR as the division west cdr and later deputy commander of ops for First Army, retiring as MG. I doubt many AD officers had his equivalent experience to rank, basically working full time a position ahead of his grade from CPT until retirement. It has its pluses, you never really PCS, deployments are periodic, but you generally end up a grade below your actual job compared to your AD counter parts.
 
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Well, before GWOT, back in the Dark Ages of the Clinton era, very, very few reserve and NG personnel/units were activated, and when they were, a lot were used in different roles than they were supposed to fill (in the Navy, anyway). Of course GWOT changed all of that and the mantra became "if you haven't deployed, you will" and "not 'if' but 'when.'"

It seems on the Navy side, the powers-that-be who decide how to utilize non-AD personnel change every couple years, and with them, their pet plans.

At least in my field, the medical side of the house, it's a natural place for women in uniform to serve, and aside from the utter bitching and moaning about the austere field life of a fleet hospital (kinda like MASH, but not really; and nothing really austere about it), I have seen no issues (with women in these roles). Even when the Navy medical reserve component gets activated and members are far-flung across the globe, despite perhaps being in totally new roles with totally new responsibilities, in support capacities it seems to pan out. Female corpsmen, however, that may be attached to a Marine infantry unit in these situations? Not a chance.
 
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