do not second guess your NCOs as a collective.... and do not insult them by asking a PFC or PV2 for verification of what they told you. NCOs get paid to lead, and to help YOU; use that to your advantage for the greater good.
Things Every "O" Should Know
- Thread starter Marauder06
- Start date
I don't need you to tell me what a good job you're doing. If you're doing well, my sergeant major will tell me. Your boss will tell me. Your first sergeant and your platoon sergeants will tell me. I'll see it in your organizational statistics- AWOL/UCMJ rates, APFT and weapons qualifications scores, property inventories, maintenance readiness reports. I'll hear it on organizational runs and in unit-level sporting events. I'll see it in the way your Soldiers look, act, and sound.
And I'll hear it from the most important critic of all- your Soldiers.
Save the self-promoting cheerleading for your OER support form and do your job- 1) accomplishing the mission and 2) taking care of troops.
And I'll hear it from the most important critic of all- your Soldiers.
Save the self-promoting cheerleading for your OER support form and do your job- 1) accomplishing the mission and 2) taking care of troops.
"out of the box"
Don't talk to me about "out of the box" until you first understand what's "in" that box. A lot of people a lot smarter than you, with a whole lot more time in uniform than you've got, spent a lot of time and effort into building that box for you, and putting tools in it for you to use (doctrine, SOPs, etc.).
Too often, "I think outside the box" means, "I'm not smart enough to understand the art and science of modern warfare, so I'm going to go off and do my own thing." That kind of thinking makes everyone else's job harder. I want you to use initiative and come up with creative ways to accomplish the mission, but I want you to have the knowledge base to ensure you're not wasting your time or jeopardizing your Soldiers by re-inventing the wheel.
Don't talk to me about "out of the box" until you first understand what's "in" that box. A lot of people a lot smarter than you, with a whole lot more time in uniform than you've got, spent a lot of time and effort into building that box for you, and putting tools in it for you to use (doctrine, SOPs, etc.).
Too often, "I think outside the box" means, "I'm not smart enough to understand the art and science of modern warfare, so I'm going to go off and do my own thing." That kind of thinking makes everyone else's job harder. I want you to use initiative and come up with creative ways to accomplish the mission, but I want you to have the knowledge base to ensure you're not wasting your time or jeopardizing your Soldiers by re-inventing the wheel.
First of all, let me say that I agree with you 100%. Some officers get a lot of people killed because they do use some "creative" tactics; but upon close analysis, those tactics are clearly unsound or just simply stupid.
I am a huge believer in out of the box thinking, but it takes a long time to get someone to the point where he is capable of doing so. The problem i have seen is that most officers don't get enough time to really learn small unit tactics. A lot of young platoon commanders are lucky to get a year and a combat deployment before they are forced elsewhere.
That being said, I try to promote out of the box thinking from my Marines. Too often I see guys hide behind doctrine and SOPs and that will also get people killed. There is no doctrine or SOP that will cover every situation. Doctrine and SOPs are generic by necessity. Leaders need to read the situation at hand and make the best decision based on the information at hand. The best leaders (at every level) will do this quickly and intuitively while their soldiers. The best answer might be something that is not found in doctrine or may even be counter to doctrine or SOPs.
One of my team leaders was moving to a target site during the battle of Fallujah when he saw a fire team of Marines rush into a house, only to get chewed up as they attempted to make entry into the open door way. The squad leader, some sergeant, grabs another fire team and they make a similarly catastrophic attempt at entry. The sergeant, God bless his heart, was yelling for "more bodies!!!!" so he could make another attempt at entry when my team leader stopped him (TL is a SSgt). TL takes his point man, strips off as much of his gear as he can and scales the side of the building. Now, this is doctrinely sound, as a top down clear is preferred to a bottom up clear, but to do it with two guys is crazy. To spider man up the side of a building during the battle of Fallujah is f*cking nuts. He makes entry through a window and clears the second story. As he attempts to assault down the stairs, he is repelled by an intense amount of fire. He looks around and seeings drums of kerosene and oil the enemy was stockpiling in their strongpoint for cooking, heat etc. He drops the drums down the stairs accompanied by three or four grenades, effectively hibachi-ing the enemy squad reinforced downstairs and forcing the burning insurgents out the front door to the friendly arms of the badly wounded squad who was more than happy to take them out of their misery.
Now I am not saying that all officers are capable of doing this. I try to promote this behavior and I ground it by telling them to run their "great ideas" through their platoon sergeant, team leaders etc. Interested to hear some other perspectives on this.
fuck yes. and telling your privates and junior NCOs "think outside the box" when they have no time "in the box" (double entendre on purpose) is a recipe for disaster. if nothing else, trust in your Senior NCOs. they'll lead you to success 90% of the time or better.
I think your story is a great example of doing what you can with the cards you're dealt. stupid? maybe. but if it's stupid, but works....
In 3rd ID, we called that "AUDacity." (in reference to Audie L. Murphy, one of our most famous "Alums".) throwing aside doctrine when doctrine doesn't apply or can't be applied effectively, to get the mission accomplished in the most expedient manner. that's what "thinking outside the box" really means. not, "I don't get it, so I'm just gonna wing it." THAT shit gets people killed, and keeps guys like me busy for a LOOOOng time, unnecessarily.
great posts, gentlemen.
Excellent post. Rep.
That's the trick, isn't it, to know where "the book" stops being useful, and when improvisation and innovation are required?
Generally speaking, I think the farther down the experience ladder you are, the less you need to be doing "out of the box" stuff. Doctrine and common training are useful to establish the baseline "OPORD" for you to "FRAGO" off of when things start going downhill.
Again absolutely right. No one comes out of IOBC as Rommel. Not even Rommel.
Entry level schools provide leaders with a baseline for success. It's not exactly an equation but it is may as well be. Do this when this happens and you will be successful most of the time. Maintain a high level of discipline, be aggressive and conduct challenging and realistic training. I think the book will make you into an above average combat leader. If you follow everything to the letter, you will do well in the military. Not great but certainly above average. Not everyone is capable of moving beyond that.
You can look at it this way. Warfare is not complicated. I didn't say it was easily but it is deceptively simple. We make it seem more complicated than it needs to be a lot of times. Think about it. There are four ways to be attacked: contact front, rear, left and right (thanks to the Air Force we don't have to worry about above so much). Yeah there is terrain, and defilade and a lot of factors but at the end of the day, front, rear, left and right. If you are smart and you understand terrain you can predict where an attack is going to come from. Where would you like to be if you were going to attack someone? Yep, that is where they are at. You didn't take ten minutes to think about that before you stepped out on this patrol? Yep, yer screwed.
You take contact and then what? Gain fire superiority and quickly do something aggressive and violent and fight your way to a decision point! This is where I see a lot of guys screw things up. The role of an officer is to get his Marines or soldiers to the last 300 yds. You use supporting arms and CAS to suppress the enemy long enough for your guys to get within 300 yds. You can do all sorts of cool maneuvers until then but at the 300 yd line you are pretty much out of the fight. The best way to control a unit within the last 300 yds is to accept that you have no control and trust in your NCOs. A good officer can prepare for the close fight by using SOPs, IA drills and tactical decision games that will train his men to recognize his commander's intent for several generic but common situations. This is how you push command and control to the lowest level and are able to control the uncontrollable... I think I will call it maneuver warfare!
The aim of every military unit in history has been to find the enemy, fix them in place and conduct a flanking attack. Modern warfare is no different. The only difference here is most of our contacts nowadays are on the receiving end of an ambush which puts us at a severe disadvantage. Both figuratively and literally, most battles are now initiated and resolved within the last 300 yards. Once fire superiority has been achieved, a unit will fight it's way to a decision point. This decision point is simply who will flank and who will fix. Not complicated. Again, a simple understanding of terrain will help facilitate this decision making. Even better if team 1 realizes that they are the least engaged unit and assumes the flanking attack because that is what they knew had to happen based on commanders' intent. At some point every attack will turn into a frontal assault, which is the simplest form of attack. The success or defeat of even the most complicated operations in WWII eventually hinged on a private with a rifle. Or more aptly a sergeant with a handful of armed privates. We think we have mastered this decentralized command and control system but while we talk about "strategic corporals", I have seen a lot more "UAV leadership" from battalion commanders trying to control the minutia from UAV feed. Which works great if anyone was wondering. Ditto JLENs leadership.
So what's the secret? If the leaders on both sides of the fight are equally competent tactically it is not enough to be doctrinally sound. We may not have to worry about this as much in the modern fight but we will eventually fight a competent uniformed military again. Doctrine does not help you when you are fighting a Hannibal or Stonewall Jackson because they have mastered doctrine and have progressed beyond it.
What is beyond doctrine? Doctrine is a very useful framework of tactics and formations but the greatest combat leaders have surpassed the tangible factors of war and understand the intangible elements of battle. Napoleon once said the moral is to the physical as three is to one. The enemy falls prey to the same human factors that we do and the best leaders will strive to impose the maximum amount of fear, confusion and panic upon them. This may mean doing something unexpected. Unexpected usually means tactically inappropriate. Why would Hannibal cross the Alps when he knew he would take heavy cold weather casualties? Why would Scipio Africanus cross the med and attack Carthage when Hannibal was right outside the gates of Rome? Why would Admiral Sprague assault a large Japanese battle group with a handful of escort carriers and destroyers? In all these cases a leader made a bold and extremely risky decision that had tremendous gains. Decision making like this though requires mastery of doctrine and tactics, a claim most young officers cannot make (in public anyway!)
If you're an O1 on your first day on the job at I don't know maybe some forward location, don't report in to your new boss wearing a "secret squirrel" novelty patch on your ACUs. If you do, don't wonder why your first day in the organization and the last day in the organization are the same day.
Yes, this really happened.
Yes, this really happened.
I'm chuckling, way down deep, in my belly.......I already have the visual.....;)
Heh heh heh heh :)
Heh heh heh heh :)
I was telling Free... a bunch of my guys followed the O1 into my office after they saw the patch, they told me later they were thinking, "This is going to be good, wait 'til the boss sees THAT shit..." ;)
despite what you may have learned in Ranger School. a blown-out and structurally unstable Iraqi Ammo bunker is NOT always a good place to set up an OP.
If you ask your 1SG an honest question, don't be surprised if he gives you an honest answer.
If you ask your 1SG an honest question, don't be surprised if he gives you an honest answer.
Truths and Imperatives...
SOF Truths
Humans are more important than Hardware. (This has been echoed in most of the previous posts...)
Quality is better than Quantity. (Not only in personnel but in training events. Once your guys get it they get it. Move on and improve the next skill...)
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. (You may not start as a young "O" in SOF, but if you are here asking questions you will likely end up here. Take a look around every where you are and see why this one rings true...)
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. (This doesn't only apply to SOF. Competence is required everywhere in our military. Where ever you end up ensure you are a catalyst for it...)
Most special operations require non-SOF assistance. (Most not all... but, in SOF units not everybody is an Operator (that was COL Collins point when he wrote these...))
These imperatives are not getting add-ins take'em to heart and ponder them though. Again, more and more in the COIN environment we see today these apply outside "SOF" and with the conventional forces...
SOF Imperatives
Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization
SOF Truths
Humans are more important than Hardware. (This has been echoed in most of the previous posts...)
Quality is better than Quantity. (Not only in personnel but in training events. Once your guys get it they get it. Move on and improve the next skill...)
Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced. (You may not start as a young "O" in SOF, but if you are here asking questions you will likely end up here. Take a look around every where you are and see why this one rings true...)
Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. (This doesn't only apply to SOF. Competence is required everywhere in our military. Where ever you end up ensure you are a catalyst for it...)
Most special operations require non-SOF assistance. (Most not all... but, in SOF units not everybody is an Operator (that was COL Collins point when he wrote these...))
These imperatives are not getting add-ins take'em to heart and ponder them though. Again, more and more in the COIN environment we see today these apply outside "SOF" and with the conventional forces...
SOF Imperatives
Understand the operational environment
Recognize political implications
Facilitate interagency activities
Engage the threat discriminately
Consider long-term effects
Ensure legitimacy and credibility of Special Operations
Anticipate and control psychological effects
Apply capabilities indirectly
Develop multiple options
Ensure long-term sustainment
Provide sufficient intelligence
Balance security and synchronization
Does anyone knows "The fighter soldier" from Major W.A.S. Dunlop?
There are 40 principles for a "leader". I think it could apply for an O.
I got a french translate so I need a few time to shift it in bad english unless someone got the book in its house.;)
:2c:
There are 40 principles for a "leader". I think it could apply for an O.
I got a french translate so I need a few time to shift it in bad english unless someone got the book in its house.;)
:2c:
Take care of your retiring Soldiers. Regardless of how much work there is to do, or how short handed you are....it is very important they get their ACAP classes, physicals and transition classes EARLIER than later.
- Joined
- Jan 25, 2009
- Messages
- 7
Just because you "can" do something doesn't mean you "should." This came to mind during a discussion about officers having moustaches but is applicable in a number of other situations as well.
Avoid needless data calls and excess work for your subordinates by not asking questions you really don't care about. For example, don't ask what tribe Abu Shi'thead is from unless you need the information to help you make a decision. Your subordinates will spend all kinds of time looking up the answer because it was important enough to you to ask about, and that's time they could be spending doing something that actually means something to you.
This is more important the more senior in rank you get, I can't count the number of times I've seen a needless staff spin-ex in response to a completely meaningless question asked by a GO...
This is more important the more senior in rank you get, I can't count the number of times I've seen a needless staff spin-ex in response to a completely meaningless question asked by a GO...
I thought I had to look up something on his cousin U'ra Shi'itehead a few years ago I believe they are part of the F'ug'mewi'ithacro'wbar Tribe. :doh:
Mara, the same thing happens in the Corporate civilian world - I've been dressed down by my immediate superiors when I ask the next level why they need a certain piece of inforamtion, and then go to my direct boss with the answer "oh, I was just wondering out loud, it's not something you need to research" after 3 hours of work...
Mara, the same thing happens in the Corporate civilian world - I've been dressed down by my immediate superiors when I ask the next level why they need a certain piece of inforamtion, and then go to my direct boss with the answer "oh, I was just wondering out loud, it's not something you need to research" after 3 hours of work...
Along with this, set reasonable timelines for your data requests and realize that subordinate units don't sit around waiting for you to call with taskers.
I was on the division staff and got a call from MEF G-6 around 1000 one day. They wanted a serialized inventory of all 117s in the division. Not a problem, except they wanted that list by 1500 that day so they could compile the results for the entire MEF & send it to Systems Command. Not sure why the list already in the EKMS system wasn't good enough, but they wanted a sight inventory on ALL PRC-117s. I told them it'd take a couple of days (the radios were spread amongst our 17 subordinate battalions; the comm chiefs have a lot on their plates) and they could have it by the end of the week. When they started stammering & stuttering saying "but Systems Command wants this today", I told them to give me the number for Sys Com and I'd call and let them know the timeline was BS.
Luckily the G-6 Actual agreed with me...
